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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for drug-related violence
111 results foundAuthor: Torok, Michelle Title: Comparative Rates of Violent Crime Amongst Methamphetamine and Opioid Users: Victimisation and Offending Summary: Background There have been marked changes in methamphetamine use over the past decade as more potent forms of the drug have become increasingly available, particularly crystalline methamphetamine. A major concern of stronger potency methamphetamine is the increased potential for harm, such as psychotic symptoms and violent behaviour. Little is currently known about what effects methamphetamine use has on violent behaviour. The current research was undertaken to improve our understanding of the association between methamphetamine use and violent victimisation and offending. Comprehensive measures including prevalence, type of offence, circumstances surrounding victimisation and offending, and the predictors of violent behaviour were used to achieve a more complex understanding of the issues surrounding methamphetamine use and violence. Methodology A sample of 400 regular methamphetamine and heroin users from the greater Sydney region were interviewed face-to-face regarding their lifetime and most recent experiences of violent victimisation and offending. Participants in the study were recruited through advertisements placed in needle and syringe programs (NSPs), therapeutic communities, street press publications, and word of mouth. To be eligible for inclusion in the survey, respondents had to be at least 18 years of age, have a satisfactory understanding of English, and have used either methamphetamine or illicit opiates at least weekly over the past 12 months. The sample was categorised into three key groups based on whether they used methamphetamine or heroin most regularly: primary methamphetamine users (PM), primary heroin users (PH), and combined primary methamphetamine and heroin users (PMH). Only physical violence was measured in this study, which included assault, armed robbery, homicide, and sexual assault. Key findings Violent victimisation The lifetime risk of violent victimisation was nearly universal. Across the whole sample, 95% had ever been a victim of violence, and nearly half (46%) had experienced victimisation in the past 12 months. The overwhelming majority had been victimised on multiple occasions across a lifetime measure. Methamphetamine use was not a significant risk factor for violent victimisation. The results indicate that the major predictors of violent victimisation among illicit drug users were severity of alcohol use, a predisposition towards antisocial behaviour (i.e. a childhood history of Conduct Disorder), and drug dealing. The data indicates that being involved in illicit drug markets substantially increases the risk of victimisation and that, at some point, those who remain in these environments have a high risk of being assaulted Almost two-thirds of those who had been victimised were also under the influence of a substance at the time they were last victimised. The substances that were most commonly used prior to the most recent victimisation episode were alcohol (25%), psychostimulants (24%), and illicit opioids (24%). Nearly one-quarter of the respondents had used multiple substances prior to most recently being victimised. Violent offending The prevalence of violent offending was also high, with 82% having ever committed a violent crime, and approximately two in five having violently offended in the past 12 months. There were no group differences in the risk of lifetime offending. In the past 12 months, however, the PM group was more likely to have committed a violent crime than the PH group (51% v 35%). Nearly three-quarters (74%) of the sample had ever committed more than one violent crime. Methamphetamine use significantly increased the risk of violent offending in the past 12 months, particularly more frequent methamphetamine use. The increased risk of violent offending associated with methamphetamine use was consistent across a number of indicators, including being at greater risk for being arrested for assault and weapon offences in the preceding 12 months, and methamphetamine users being at greater risk of committing violent crime within the past month. Apart from methamphetamine use, other factors that were found to increase the risk of committing violence were heavier alcohol use, Conduct Disorder, selling drugs, and being younger. Risk perceptions of violence The majority of the sample perceived that it would be 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely' that they would be either a victim of violence (78%) or violent offender (87%) in the following 12 months, despite the high prevalence of violent victimisation and offending experienced in the previous 12 months. The majority of respondents had also witnessed high levels of victimisation and offending, and this also appears to have no impact on their own perceived risk of being exposed to violence in the future. Among those who had recently (i.e. in the last 12 months) been a victim of violence, or physically assaulted someone, the perceived risk of future victimisation and offending was higher than those who had not recently been exposed to violence. Key points: Summary of violent crime among illicit drug users - Violent victimisation was almost universal, with 95% of the sample having ever been victimised, and 46% having been a victim of violence in the past 12 months. - Violent offending was also highly prevalent, with 82% of respondents having committed a violent crime across their lifetime, and 41% having done so in the past 12 months. - Methamphetamine use did not increase the lifetime, or past 12 month, risk of violent victimisation. - Heavier methamphetamine use was associated with a significantly higher risk of violent offending in the past 12 months. - The main form of methamphetamine used did not affect risk of violent victimisation or offending. - The perceived risk of being a victim or offender of a violent crime in the following 12 months was very low, despite the high rates of victimisation, and of committing violent crime, in the past 12 months. Details: Hobart, Tasmania: National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund, 2008. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph no. 32: Accessed April 17, 2018 at: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph32.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph32.pdf Shelf Number: 117106 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug-Related ViolenceMethamphetaminesOpioidsVictimizationViolent Crime |
Author: Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego Title: Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009 Summary: Mexico closed the decade with an unprecedented level of violence, and a record number of drug-related killings in 2009. In light of the spectacular nature of this violence and the challenge it represents for the Mexican state, it raises serious concerns for the Mexican public, for policy makers, and for Mexico's neighboring countries. This report provides an overview of the trends found in available data on drug-related killings in Mexico, and offers some brief observations about the causes of violence and the effectiveness of recent efforts to combat organized crime. Details: San Diego, CA: Trans-Border Institute, 2010. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2010 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/2010-Shirk-JMP-Drug_Violence.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/2010-Shirk-JMP-Drug_Violence.pdf Shelf Number: 120171 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolence (Mexico)Violent Crime |
Author: U.S. Senate. Caucus on International Narcotics Control Title: U.S. and Mexican Responses to Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Violence in Mexico continues unhindered without any signs of slowing. This report outlines a series of concrete steps the United States can take to support the Mexican government in its fight against drug trafficking organizations and drug-related violence. While our security partnership with Mexico has deepened in recent years, more can be done to help. The attached report synthesizes information gathered by Caucus staff through a country visit, briefings, interviews, and a review of documents from both government and non-government subject matter experts. The report describes the current strategy and provides important recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: The Caucus, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/Mexico-Report-Final-5-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/Mexico-Report-Final-5-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 121837 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Control PolicyDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Trafficking ControlDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized Crime |
Author: Ten Velde, Liza Title: The Northern Triangle’s Drugs-Violence Nexus: The role of the Drugs Trade in Criminal Violence and Policy Responses in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras Summary: Mexico has occupied the limelight when it comes to media attention focusing on drug-related violence in Latin America. However, it is actually Central America's Northern Triangle – consisting of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – currently experiencing much higher rates of violence and increasing Drug Trafficking Organization (DTOs) activity, thus providing an illustration of the 'balloon effect' previously experienced by Mexico itself after the implementation of Plan Colombia which was conceived at the end of the 90's. Together the countries of the Northern Triangle now form one of the most violent regions on earth. Although it is clear that the violence in Honduras,El Salvador and Guatemala is pervasive and able to destabilize these Central American societies to a large extent, no consensus seems to exist on its exact causes. As in Mexico, much of the violence is attributed to the increased role of Central America as a transit region for controlled drugs destined for the US. This paper will address the particulars of the high levels of criminal violence in the Northern Triangle, and try to assess to what extent the drugs trade is responsible for this violence. The recently reinvigorated debate on alternative approaches to drug control strategies in the Americas suggests changes in drugs policies can be expected from the central American region, but in spite of the similarities of the challenges posed to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras when it comes to drug-related problems and criminal violence, the positions occupied by the political leaders of these countries in this incipient debate differ considerably. Concluding remarks It is clear that the upsurge in levels of criminal violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle can be attributed to a considerable extent to the growing importance of this region for drug trafficking operations. The increased presence of Mexican DTOs and the threat they pose to local criminal organizations is a notable source of violent conflict. Meanwhile, the ties between DTOs and local transportistas and gangs have also strengthened, with the latter groups becoming better organized and increasingly involved in the drug trade. As noted, determining with any precision to what extent drug-related issues are responsible for growing criminal violence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras is as yet impossible. Even determining precisely the role of the much broader category of organized crime has proved to be unfeasible. The correlation between growing violence and intensified drug operations in the Northern Triangle, however, is striking. In itself, this could mean that the call for alternative approaches from one of these countries’ leaders might not come as such a surprise, given the extent to which the violence and drug trade are destabilizing the region. What should not be overlooked, however, is the extent to which the mano dura approaches and accompanying strategy of militarization as pursued by the Northern Triangle’s governments are in themselves sources of severe destabilization and of rising levels of violence. This, combined with the alleged use of drug trafficking as a pretext for increasing state control over areas with conflicts between local citizens and the authorities further complicates the situation. Notwithstanding, these difficulties should not lead us to disregard the fact that the call for a discussion on alternative approaches by Guatemala’s president is a remarkable development, which has significantly contributed to and broadened the wider regional debate on a departure from the prevailing war-on-drugs strategies. In the face of US opposition and disagreement of some of the other Central American countries, this has been no small feat. The current discrepancy between repressive drug control legislation in the Northern Triangle combined with the mano dura approaches of the region’s authorities to criminal violence and drug trafficking, and the proposed alternative measures is enormous, but the Guatemalan government seems to be serious about its desire to learn more about potential alternative policy options. While it is of course not realistic to expect a fundamental redirecting of the region’s strategies to counter drug trafficking and criminal violence in the short term, some cautious optimism in assessing the possibility of changes towards more effective and humane drug policies in the Northern Triangle might not be entirely misplaced. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2012. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Debate Paper No. 19: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/debate19.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/debate19.pdf Shelf Number: 127146 Keywords: Drug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceViolent Crime (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras) |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center Title: Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program. Drug Market Analysis 2011 Summary: The overall drug threat to the Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands (PR/USVI) High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) has remained relatively consistent over the past year. Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) transport multikilogram quantities of cocaine and South American (SA) heroin through the PR/USVI HIDTA region en route to drug markets in the continental United States (CONUS). While most of the cocaine and heroin arriving in the region is further transported to the CONUS for distribution, a portion remains in the HIDTA region for local distribution and consumption. As a result, cocaine trafficking and heroin abuse are the principal drug threats to the PR/USVI HIDTA region. In addition, cannabis cultivation and the subsequent distribution and abuse of marijuana pose serious threats to the region. Murders and incidents of violence linked to cocaine trafficking have increased in Puerto Rico over the past year, resulting in widespread fear among the general population because of the often indiscriminate nature of the violence. Key issues identified in the PR/USVI HIDTA region include the following: • Colombian and Venezuelan DTOs have shifted some of their cocaine air transportation routes from the Dominican Republic to the eastern Caribbean in the vicinity of the British Virgin Islands and the USVI.1 • Cocaine continues to pose the greatest drug threat to the region because of the continued high level of trafficking in the PR/USVI HIDTA region. • The number of murders and other violent incidents linked to cocaine trafficking increased in Puerto Rico during the past year. • Heroin abuse is prevalent in Puerto Rico, with high rates of bacterial and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infections occurring among heroin abusers, who typically inject the drug. • The PR/USVI HIDTA region is a major bulk cash movement center for drug traffickers operating in the region and the CONUS. Details: Johnstown, PA: National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/dmas/PR-VI_DMA-2011(U).pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/dmas/PR-VI_DMA-2011(U).pdf Shelf Number: 127827 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug Trafficking (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands)Drug-Related ViolenceIllicit DrugsOrganized Crime |
Author: Robles, Gustavo Title: The Economic Consequences of Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico Summary: The levels of violence in Mexico have dramatically increased in the last few years due to structural changes in the drug trafficking business. The increase in the number of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) fighting over the control of territory and trafficking routes has resulted in a substantial increase in the rates of homicides and other crimes. This study evaluates the economic costs of drug-‐related violence. We propose electricity consumption as an indicator of the level of municipal economic activity and use two different empirical strategies to test this. We utilize an instrumental variable regression using as exogenous variation the instrument proposed by Castillo, Mejía, and Restrepo (2013) based on historical seizures of cocaine in Colombia interacted with the distance of the Mexican border towns to the United States. We find that marginal increases of violence have negative effects on labor participation and the proportion of unemployed in an area. The marginal effect of the increase in homicides is substantive for earned income and the proportion of business owners, but not for energy consumption. We also employ the methodology of synthetic controls to evaluate the effect that inter-‐narco wars have on local economies. These wars in general begin with a wave of executions between rival criminal organizations and are accompanied by the deterioration of order and a significant increase in extortion, kidnappings, robberies, murders, and threats affecting the general population. To evaluate the effect that these wars between different drug trafficking organizations have on economic performance, we define the beginning of a conflict as the moment when we observe an increase from historical violence rates at the municipal level beyond a certain threshold, and construct counterfactual scenarios as an optimal weighted average from potential control units. The analysis indicates that the drug wars in those municipalities that saw dramatic increases in violence between 2006 and 2010 significantly reduced their energy consumption in the years after the change occurred. Details: Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 28, 2013 at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24014/RoblesCalderonMagaloni_EconCosts5.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24014/RoblesCalderonMagaloni_EconCosts5.pdf Shelf Number: 128839 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime (Mexico, U.S.)Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomics of CrimeHomicidesKidnappingsOrganized CrimeViolent Crimes |
Author: Yepes, Rodrigo Uprimny Title: Addicted to Punishment: The disproportionality of drug laws in Latin America Summary: This document analyzes the proportionality of drug related crimes in seven Latin American countries through the study of the evolution of their criminal legislations from 1950 until 2012. The study suggests the existence of a regional tendency to maximize the use of criminal law for combating this type of conducts. This is reflected in: i) the gradual increase in the number of drug-related conducts described as criminal, ii) the exponential growth of the penalties with which those conducts are punished and iii) the incomprehensible tendency of punishing with more severity the drug-related crimes rather than those more evidently severe such as homicide, rape and aggravated robbery. Those upward trends indicate that the Latin American States have become addicted to punishment because of their frequent and empirically groundless increasing of the punitive dose, regardless of its constantly decreasing benefits. Addicted to punishment is part of a series of studies carried out by the Research Consortium on Drugs and the Law (CEDD) that critically analyze the application of the proportionality principle in relation with drug crimes. The studies find that the punishments imposed and the punitive treatment of the offenders are disproportional, often generating more damages than benefits. Details: Bogota, Columbia: Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia, 2013. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Dejusticia Working Paper 1: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: www.dejusticia.org Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: Shelf Number: 128904 Keywords: Drug Abuse and Crime (Latin America)Drug PolicyDrug-Related ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Palaung Women's Organization Title: Still Imprisoned: Opium cultivation soars in Palaung areas under Burma’s new regime Summary: Almost one year after Burma’s long-awaited elections were held in November 2010, Palaung communities in northern Shan State are suffering from the effects of an even greater upsurge in opium cultivation than in previous years. Local paramilitary leaders, some now elected into Burma’s new parliament, are being allowed to cultivate and profit from drugs in return for helping the regime suppress ethnic resistance forces in Burma’s escalating civil war. As a result, drug addiction has escalated in the Palaung area, tearing apart families and communities. Burma’s drug problems are set to worsen unless there is genuine political reform that addresses the political aspirations of Burma’s ethnic minority groups. Research carried out by Palaung Women’s Organization in Namkham Township shows that: •Opium cultivation across 15 villages in Namkham Township has increased by a staggering 78.58% within two years. •12 villages in the same area, which had not previously grown opium, have started to grow opium since 2009. •A signify cant number of these villages are under the control of government paramilitary “anti-insurgency” forces, which are directly profiting from the opium trade. •The most prominent militia leader and drug-lord in the area, “Pansay” Kyaw Myint, from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, was elected as an MP for Namkham in November 2010; he promised voters that they could grow opium freely for 5 years if they voted for him. •Government troops, police and militia continue to openly tax opium farmers, and to collect bribes from drug addicts in exchange for their release from custody. •Drug addiction in Palaung communities has spiraled out of control. In one Palaung village, PWO found that 91% of males aged 15 and over were addicted to drugs. Drug addiction is causing huge problems for families, with women and children bearing the burden of increased poverty, crime and violence. Details: Mae Sot, Thailand: Palaung Women's Organization, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 4, 2013 at: http://www.burmapartnership.org/2011/10/still-imprisoned/ Year: 2011 Country: Thailand URL: http://www.burmapartnership.org/2011/10/still-imprisoned/ Shelf Number: 128929 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug-Related ViolenceNarcotics (Thailand)Opium |
Author: Cohen, Mark A. Title: Violence and Crime in Latin America Summary: The public survey that was conducted by the IDB for this project identified the problem of “crime and violence” to be one of the areas of major concern in Latin America. In particular, the following items were identified (in descending or perceived priority): (a) high incidence of crime, (b) drug trafficking, (c) proliferation of violent youth gangs, (d) pervasiveness of money laundering, and (e) frequency of domestic violence. In conducting the research for this present paper, we evaluated the nature of the evidence on the extent to which these perceived issues would rise to the level of being “significant,” as well as the evidence on “what works” and what the benefits and costs are from programs that have been shown to be effective. Setting the boundaries of our analysis was a difficult task, but one that we needed to do in order to arrive at a solutions document that would be of value to policy makers. For example, while most incidents of crime and violence are essentially “local,” the causes and potential solutions to crime might lie well outside the local or even national jurisdiction. This is true globally – where many types of crimes are clearly of a global character and require more than local solutions. There are several very stark examples of this problem in the case of crime and violence in Latin America. For example, the demand for drugs in the U.S. and Europe will have an impact on the supply of drugs in various Latin American countries – and hence will impact organized crime and gang-related violence. Because these markets operate outside of traditional legal institutions, enforcement of property rights disputes, for example, also take place outside normal legal channels – hence contributing to the demand for violence itself. Moreover, because the demand for drugs is coming outside of Latin America, any attempt to reduce the supply of drugs in one “hot spot” country in Latin America will ultimately backfire as drug production is shifted to another country to keep up with the demand. There is good evidence that this has happened repeatedly in Latin America. Thus, without global solutions, a Latin American solution to this problem is unlikely to succeed. Drug and terrorism policy in the U.S. and Europe can also affect crime and violence in Latin America. For example, the U.S. war on drugs has led to the extradition of drug lords – something that has destabilized the Colombian drug market, for example, with the ultimate effect of more violence between organized drug cartels to gain control over local areas. This contrasts with the approach taken in Europe which is largely to treat drugs as a ‘consumption’ problem at home. Similarly, some researchers have suggested that immigration and prison policies in the U.S. affect crime and gang-related violence in Latin America. For example, illegal immigrants who have committed crimes while in the U.S. will serve time in prison and then be deported to their home country. To the extent that returning prisoners have joined gangs in U.S. prisons and transfer knowledge and experience back to their home countries – this exacerbates the gang violence problem in the home country. In this paper, we take these factors as exogenous and beyond the scope of our immediate concern – which is to identify the most cost-beneficial programs that can be implemented in Latin America to reduce crime and violence given the current situation and institutions within which we have to work. Policy discussions over crime and violence in Latin America have oftentimes been framed using political and ideological themes. Thus, for example, calls for more police and tougher prison sentences are often seen as attempts by the “right” to control the underclass. Similarly, calls for prevention programs through better education, jobs, and an enhanced standard of living to reduce the desirability of illegal occupations are often seen as “socialist” solutions by the right. Given this political backdrop as well as the fact that the field of criminology itself has historical roots in sociology, there is scant empirical evidence on either the extent of criminal behavior or the effectiveness of prevention or control strategies in Latin America. Police records are notoriously poor – and often generated by corrupt politicians or police administrations to support their point of view. There have only been a few comprehensive victimization surveys in some countries, and any significant crosscountry comparisons that can be made are of only limited value unlike more detailed surveys in the U.S. and Europe. There are also no reliable indicators of drugs or arms trafficking or the influence of organized crime. Measures of these problems are largely indirect and subject to considerable uncertainty. Thus, in the following section on the extent of crime and violence in Latin America, the uninitiated reader might be struck by the lack of solid data – but this is a persistent problem in measuring crime and violence. Details: Unpublished paper, 2007. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Solutions Paper: Accessed June 22, 2013 at: http://www.iadb.org/res/ConsultaSanJose/files/ViolenceCrime_Cohen_SP_Final.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Central America URL: http://www.iadb.org/res/ConsultaSanJose/files/ViolenceCrime_Cohen_SP_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 112426 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolent Crime (Latin America)Youth Gangs |
Author: BenYishay, Ariel Title: 1 Homicide and Work: The Impact of Mexico’s Drug War on Labor Market Participation Summary: We estimate the impact of the escalation of the drug war in Mexico on the mean hours worked among the general population. We focus on homicides, which have increased dramatically since 2006. To identify the relationship between changes in homicides and hours worked, we exploit the large variation in the trajectory of violence across states and over time. Using panel and instrumental variables regressions, we find that the increase in homicides has negatively impacted labor force activity. An increase in homicides of 10 per 100,000 in a given state is associated with a decline of 0.3 weekly hours worked among the state’s population. For states most impacted by the drug war, in which homicides per 100,000 inhabitants have increased by 30-50 a year, this implies an average decline in hours worked of one to one and a half hours per week. These impacts are larger for the self-employed and are concentrated among the highest income quartiles. This highlights how the costs of crime tend to be unequally born by certain segments of the population. Details: Unpublished paper, 2013. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://www.colgate.edu/docs/d_academics_departments-and-programs_economics_colgate-hamilton-seminar-series/homicide-and-work-the-impact-of-mexico's-drug-war-on-labor-market-participation-2-27-13.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.colgate.edu/docs/d_academics_departments-and-programs_economics_colgate-hamilton-seminar-series/homicide-and-work-the-impact-of-mexico's-drug-war-on-labor-market-participation-2-27-13.pdf?sfvrsn=2 Shelf Number: 129205 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug War (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceEconomics and CrimeHomicidesLabor Force Participation |
Author: Negroponte, Diana Villiers Title: The Merida Initiative and Central America: The Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence Summary: The rising level of violence in Central America, as well as Mexico, has created sensational headlines in the daily press and Hollywood style footage on the nightly news. The focus of this violence has been on the drug cartels and the fights among them for routes to market both in the United States and within the region. However, parallel to the drug related violence caused by the cartels are two distinct, but related issues: a pervasive sense of public insecurity and rising levels of criminal violence. Both are related, but not directly attributable, to the possession and trade in illegal drugs. Intentional homicide, assault, robbery, extortion and fraud have all risen in the last seven years leading us to ask how serious is the problem, what should national governments do to contain, if not prevent their occurrence, and what is the appropriate U.S. contribution. This monograph will examine the reasons for the growth in public insecurity within El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, known as the Northern Triangle, and seek to determine the effectiveness of government policies to restore public trust and security. In the pursuit of greater security, these governments, as well as Mexico, have called upon Washington to assist them.1 The affected governments emphasize a “shared responsibility” to engage in reducing levels of violence, reduce consumption of illegal drugs, regulate the sale of firearms to the cartels and organized crime, as well as to confront corruption and impunity that pervade state institutions.2 The problems are regional, if not global, and to be effective, the response should include both U.S. federal and state authorities. Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2009. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Number 3: Accessed July 1, 2013 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/merida%20initiative%20negroponte/05_merida_initiative_negroponte.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Central America URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/merida%20initiative%20negroponte/05_merida_initiative_negroponte.pdf Shelf Number: 129221 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesMerida InitiativeOrganized CrimeViolence (Central America)Violent Crime |
Author: Lundin, Lars-Erie Title: Perils of the Drug Trade: Implications and Challenges of Central Asia's "Northern Route" Summary: The international trade in Afghan drugs is one of the most significant transnational threats emanating from Central Asia. Exacerbated by weak border management, corruption, and lack of income-generating alternatives, the “Northern Route” is a scourge not only for the Central Asian states but also Russia and Europe, undermining a vision of a Eurasian community based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as posing attendant health risks. International efforts have so far failed to adequately come to grips with the problem. It is clear that there is no quick fix and that hope rests in a mixture of instruments, not least promoting long-term socio-economic development in the region, stemming pervasive corruption, engaging in human rights dialogues, as well as promoting more effective international cooperation—in particular involving Russia. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: The Institute for Security and Development Policy , 2013. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Review No. 125: Accessed July 8, 2013 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-lundin-vankaathoven-central-asia-northern-route.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Asia URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-lundin-vankaathoven-central-asia-northern-route.pdf Shelf Number: 129275 Keywords: Border SecurityCorruptionDrug Trafficking (Asia)Drug-Related Violence |
Author: Whitfield, Teresa Title: Mediating Criminal Violence – Lessons from the gang truce in El Salvador Summary: During the 1980s El Salvador suffered a bitterly contested civil war. Negotiations mediated by the United Nations concluded in a peace agreement in 1992 and set the course for the, largely smooth, assimilation of former guerrillas in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) into Salvadoran political life. Post-war, violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups escalated as a result of the involvement of gangs and a range of other criminal actors, in parallel to similar crises of security in Guatemala and Honduras. Honduras and El Salvador were subsequently placed first and second in the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime’s global index of homicide with 92 and 69 homicides per 100,000 respectively in 2011. In a shift from previous policies which had emphasized the robust suppression of violent crime, in March 2012 facilitators answerable to the Salvadoran government mediated a controversial truce between the country’s two main gangs. The truce brought about a dramatic reduction in the country’s homicide rate whilst raising multiple questions about the risks and benefits of direct engagement with criminal actors. This paper has been written while the outcomes of the gang truce in El Salvador are still unfolding. It suggests that the truce has been imperfectly managed and remains fragile, but is also a considerable achievement. Lessons that may be derived from it are limited by the specific characteristics and circumstances of the Salvadoran gangs. Yet, they merit consideration for several reasons. The Salvadoran truce, and the arrival in Mexico of a government determined to address the country’s spiralling violence, much of which is exacerbated by competition for the gains of the illicit economy and drug trade, have placed new emphasis on alternative paths to pacification. More broadly, counternarcotics policies that for decades have been framed as a “war on drugs” are being challenged, most recently in a groundbreaking report by the Organization of American States (OAS) that specifically addresses – among other issues – “the violence and suffering associated with the drug problem” in the Americas. Elsewhere, national and international actors are struggling to craft and implement responses to organised violence and crime in situations in which criminal activities have developed as a result of unresolved conflict grievances (in South Africa, Northern Ireland and Kosovo, for example), or where they seek to shape electoral politics (in Kenya, Jamaica and the Solomon Islands), or where they hide behind grievances which are fuelling armed conflict (in Colombia, Mali and Myanmar to name but three examples). They, too, can benefit from the lessons and questions that emerge from the Salvadoran experience. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Oslo Forum Papers No. 001: Accessed July 11, 2013 at: http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Mediating-Criminal-Violence.pdf Year: 2013 Country: El Salvador URL: http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/Mediating-Criminal-Violence.pdf Shelf Number: 129373 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceGangsViolence (El Salvador)Violent Crime |
Author: Ayuso, Tomas Title: Central America : The Downward Spiral of the Northern Triangle Summary: Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have entered a perilously new era in their history. Caught between the rise in criminal violence domestically and the presence of the international drug trade, the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America is fighting for its survival. A bleak economic landscape has fostered youth gangs known as maras and domestic smugglers to build a relationship with the great drug syndicates of Mexico and South America with impunity permitted by a corrupt police and government. How have the cartels exerted such dominance over Central America with most of the US bound cocaine now going through these countries? And what can be done to regain control of an isthmus in free fall? Details: NORIA: Network of Researchers in International Affairs (www.noria-research.com), 2012. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report: Accessed July 11, 2013 at: http://www.noria-research.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Tomas-pour-PDF.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.noria-research.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Tomas-pour-PDF.pdf Shelf Number: 129376 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Honduras, Guatemala, El SalvadorDrug-Related ViolenceGangsOrganized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Foundation for the Development of Guatemala Title: Drugs, Guns and Cash: Analysis and Proposals on How To Manage the Crisis in Central America Summary: The most important message extracted from this study is that without intergovernmental and international cooperation and support, primarily between the countries most involved, Guatemala and Central America will soon collapse into failed states dominated by shadow economies and run by Criminal Organizations that buy political power. Without decisive action, these countries will be ―handed to these criminal organizations and groups of people that wish to form their own type of government system and inadvertently create greater regional instability. This scenario must not be permitted. These same groups of people will eventually take control of the agricultural and industrial markets in the region, to which the United States and many other countries depend and, will determine where and at what price they would want to sell their products. Simultaneously, the United States would lose its position and influence in Central America. As a result, the region would begin to foster a unique environment where Narco-Terrorism and quasi-states can flourish. Efforts to stem the momentum of these events from evolving must be instantaneous and holistic to produce the desired effect. The carnage and destruction experienced in Colombia and Mexico is on the doorstep of Central American countries and the criminals have resources that are far greater today. Therefore, this report was developed with the hope of achieving three purposes. First, it is a learning process and a means to bring better understanding about the deteriorating situation in Central America. Secondly, it is to engender a general awareness on the various issues that impact the national security, wellbeing and safety of the citizens of countries in Central America. Thirdly, it is to initiate a deeper and more thoughtful discussion about these topics, recognizing that old debates, paradigms, and historical assumptions must be revisited to better analyze the gravity of the situation as critically and objectively as possible. The forces of organized crime are clashing against the forces of development. This clash impedes the regions ability to develop concrete solutions. Traditional strategies have led to limited results. The type of alternative solutions that should be favored are not based on conventional wisdom but instead of a result-oriented approach. The supporting structural ideas applied throughout this report will attempt to stimulate strategic thinking, debunk myths, understand displacement and its consequences, suggest concrete and cost-effective solutions, and develop an analytical framework, which allows a balanced fact-based approach. The most significant ideas that relate to strategic thinking are cohesive intelligence sharing, combined tactics, operational strategies and a collective initiative without regional borders and barriers. In the case of debunking myths, it is necessary to end the denial phase of the current crisis in the region by confronting the reality that this is a regional problem that requires an Integrated Regional Security Strategy and, unmask numerous erroneous conceptions and assumptions within Guatemala - and other regional countries - in their political, social, and economic arenas. Lastly, to understand the seriousness of displacement and its consequences, especially around the Latin American and Caribbean region. Prioritized allocation of counter-initiative resources must be addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner or the problem will remain being shuffled around the geographic chessboard that haunts the region. Much time and effort has been devoted to the escalating problems of the region with few concrete and cost-effective solutions implemented in a timely manner. In contrast, an integrated analytical framework will guide the type of actionable strategies that are necessary to better approach these critical issues in Central America. In brief, the goal of this study is to promote a new and informed dialogue on these complex and vastly misunderstood matters. The proposed suggestions and recommendations are not meant to be final or conclusive, but rather, they are meant to spark a debate around sustainable solutions and ideas, and their potential results and benefits to the region. Hopefully, with this Central Americans can find common ground within which these findings and recommendations can be formulated and executed. Nonetheless, this report was developed with the intention of finding immediate and strategic regional solutions, underscoring a sense of urgency more so for Guatemala. Details: Ala Sur: Foundation for the Development of Guatemala, 2012. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2013 at: http://www.fundesa.org.gt/cms/content/files/DRUGS,%20GUNS%20AND%20CASH.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://www.fundesa.org.gt/cms/content/files/DRUGS,%20GUNS%20AND%20CASH.pdf Shelf Number: 129379 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Interpeace Title: National Public Policy Proposal: Prevention of Youth-Involved Violence in Belize 2012-2022 Summary: Over the last decade, Belize has been confronted by a significant increase in violence - mostly among adolescents and youths. Official statistics show that Belizean youths between the ages of 14 to 24 are getting involved in the illegal drug trade at young ages and dropping out of primary and secondary school at very high rates. As a result, they are overrepresented in prison populations and are increasingly the victims of violence. Much of the violence among this age cohort is attributed to drug-related gang violence. The proposal, titled National Public Policy Proposal: Prevention of Youth-Involved Violence in Belize 2012-2022 is based on a collaborative approach that draws from all sectors of Belizean society including the government, civil society and families. It gives a 10-year implementation framework that entails 17 strategies for addressing the underlying factors of youth-related violence. Several of these strategies are already being implemented. The strategies primarily address education as a means of empowering youths and reducing the vulnerability and marginalization of youths who are most at risk of becoming gang members. It also gives an integrated approach to confronting the risk factors of youths through suggesting initiatives that promote community participation, youth employment, and opportunities for citizen dialogue, education, sports, recreation, and culture. Aside from these prevention-oriented strategies, the proposal states the need for increasing the availability of reintegration and rehabilitation programmes for young people who have already become immersed in the culture of violence. The policy proposal serves as a tool to guide decision-making among both the Belizean state and civil society as programmes, projects, and interventions are developed and implemented. The contextual framework that takes the voices of young people into account can contribute to the implementation of the policy proposal in a way that best addresses the needs of the impacted youths. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Interpeace, 2013. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2013 at: http://www.interpeace.org/2011-08-08-15-19-20/latest-news/427-belize-proposal Year: 2013 Country: Belize URL: http://www.interpeace.org/2011-08-08-15-19-20/latest-news/427-belize-proposal Shelf Number: 129422 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceViolence PreventionYouth GangsYouth Violence (Belize) |
Author: Harvard University. Institute of Politics Title: The War on Mexican Cartels: Options for U.S. and Mexican Policy-Makers Summary: The situation in Mexico has become increasingly volatile since 2006. After a semester of research, the National Security Policy Group has come up with a list of recommendations that can help reduce the violence in Mexico and further weaken the cartels. Recommendations to Move Forward: · The Mexican government can better use its military and law enforcement personnel by: o Specializing portions of its military forces to deal with specific facets of the war on drugs by significantly reforming military training procedures, departmentalizing the military and integrating these departments into a larger bureaucratic system, and o Launching a more aggressive public relations campaign specifically targeting the major leaders of the cartels in order to reduce the culture of fear and helplessness created by the cartels. · The Mexican government must fight corruption at all governmental levels. It should: o Revise its federal reelection process to create greater accountability mechanisms for politicians in office, o Implement a more transparent fund flow between federal and state governments, o Allow for greater public participation in the selection of judges, and o Reform the wage system, and improve training, resource allocation and accountability mechanisms for law enforcement officers. · The Mexican government should take action to strengthen its community-level efforts by: o Building strong communities in which people have a wide set of options for legitimate careers by greater subsidizing education and focusing on community initiatives o Maintaining the status quo with regards to community-level self-governance and vigilante efforts. · The United States government should reinforce its counter-financing of narcotics efforts by: o Strengthening its intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, and o Drafting the necessary legislation to compel banks to freeze the assets of individuals associated with narcotics activities. · The United States government should strengthen its efforts to prevent U.S.-made weapons from falling into cartel hands by: o Making identification requirements for firearms and ammunition more stringent, and o Creating a task force to help Central American countries locate, document and secure old stockpiles of U.S. weapons that were abandoned in these countries. · The United States should increase the size and scope of the Mérida Initiative by: o Labeling the Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, o Focusing on training and equipping Mexican military personnel, and o Tying Mérida Initiative funds to initiatives by local and state Mexican governments. · Lastly, the United States government should continue to place significant emphasis on treatment, prevention and enforcement measures for domestic drug consumers. Details: Cambridge, MA: Institute of Politics, Harvard University, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2013 at: http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf Shelf Number: 129510 Keywords: Criminal Cartels (Mexico)Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Derghougassian, Khatchik Title: Under (Loose) Control: Drug Trafficking in Argentina Summary: Since the emergence of drug trafficking as a major concern on the international security agenda in early 1980s, Argentina generally has remained peripheral in the global illicit market, and was seldom characterized as a country for transit and money laundering. This situation, however, changed by the end of the 20th century when the levels of drug consumption rose dramatically in Argentine society and several official reports revealed the important role that the national industry played in providing the chemical products for cocaine and other synthetic drugs processing. Yet, despite some disturbing episodes of drug-related violence that seem involving Colombian and Mexican cartels, the structure of the local drug market, both distribution and consumption, remains under control. The main reason for this loose control that avoids the outburst of violence on a major scale is decades-old symbiosis of delinquents, police and political interests commonly labeled as the “Triple P” -standing for thugs, police and politicians (Pandillas, Policía, Políticos). Based on this hypothetical argument, this paper provides a historical perspective of the inclusion of Argentina as a peripheral market in global drug trafficking to focus on the structural evolution of the phenomenon since the 1980s up to the actuality. We are mainly concerned in explaining the shift of Argentina from a country for transit to a consumers market, as well as identifying the incoming and outgoing flows of global trafficking of the illicit drug industry, to analyze its implications for predictable changes within the Triple P structure. Details: Buenos Aires;Universidad de San Andrés, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2013 at: http://www.udesa.edu.ar/files/UAHumanidades/DT/DT%20Ciencias%20Sociales/DT15_Khatchik_DerGhougassian.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Argentina URL: http://www.udesa.edu.ar/files/UAHumanidades/DT/DT%20Ciencias%20Sociales/DT15_Khatchik_DerGhougassian.pdf Shelf Number: 129519 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Argentina)Drug-Related ViolenceIllegal DrugsIllicit MarketsOrganized Crime |
Author: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Title: National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy: 2013 Summary: The United States, at the local, state, tribal, and Federal levels, has made a concerted effort to enhance, expand, and codify multiple measures designed to address the serious threats posed by illicit drug trafficking across the Southwest border and violence in Mexico. Despite many successes, improved cooperation, coordination, unity of effort, and information sharing, illicit drug trafficking continues to be a multi-faceted threat to our national security which requires additional focus and effort. Transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico with world-wide international connections continue to dominate the illegal drug supply chain and are continuing to expand their illegal activities throughout the United States. Indeed, 90 to 95 percent of all cocaine that enters the United States continues to pass through the Mexico/Central America corridor from the cocaine source countries further south. Mexico remains the primary foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine destined for U.S. markets and is also a source and transit country for heroin. The same organizations that traffic in drugs also control the south-bound flow of drug-related bulk currency and illegal weapons. The smuggling and illegal export of weapons from the United States into Mexico is a threat to the overall safety and security of both countries and continues to fuel violence along the Southwest border and in the interior of Mexico. Indeed, weapons smuggled into Mexico often end up in the hands of the Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) or other smuggling organizations where they can be employed against law enforcement officers and citizens in either country. On its northern border with the United States, Mexico experienced a dramatic surge in border crime and violence in recent years due to intense competition between Mexican TCOs that employ predatory tactics to realize their profits. The U.S. Government continues to respond to the challenges posed by transnational criminal organizations through a variety of coordinated activities, both at the operational and national policy levels. The U.S.–Mexico bilateral relationship continues to grow based on increasingly strong, multi-layered institutional ties. The commitment of both governments to improve citizen security in each country is underscored by the Merida Initiative, an unprecedented partnership between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of law. Based on principles of shared responsibility, mutual trust, and respect for sovereign independence, the two countries’ efforts have built confidence that continues to transform and strengthen the bilateral relationship in 2013 and beyond. Details: Washington, DC: ONDPC, 2013. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/southwest_border_strategy_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/southwest_border_strategy_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129615 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug Trafficking (U.S.)Drug-Related ViolenceHomicidesNarcotics |
Author: Coy, Maddy Title: Violent Disorder in Ciudad Juarez: A Spatial Analysis of Homicide Summary: This HASOW Discussion Paper considers how demographic and socioeconomic factors correlate with homicidal violence in the context of Mexico's "war on drugs". We draw on Ciudad Juarez as a case study and social disorganization theory as an organizing framework. Social disorganization is expected to produce higher levels of homicidal violence. And while evidence detects several social disorganization factors associated with homicidal violence in Ciudad Juarez not all relationships appear as predicted by the theory. Drawing on public census and crime data, our statistical assessment detects 6 significant variables (or risks) positively associated with homicidal violence in Ciudad Juarez between 2009 and 2010. Likewise, the assessment finds 6 specific variables (or protective factors) that are negatively associated with above average homicide in the city between 2009 and 2010. The data and level of analysis do not conclusively present causation, nor was this the intent. Rather, we propose a baseline model for testing spatial-temporal dynamics of organized violence. Details: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War (HASOW), 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: HASOW Discussion Paper 1: Accessed March 20, 2014 at: http://www.hasow.org/uploads/trabalhos/68/doc/1934668792.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hasow.org/uploads/trabalhos/68/doc/1934668792.pdf Shelf Number: 131979 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceHomicideMurdersViolenceViolent CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: Ajzenman, Nicolas Title: On the Distributive Costs of Drug-Related Homicides Summary: Reliable estimates of the effects of violence on economic outcomes are scarce. We exploit the manyfold increase in homicides in 2008-2011 in Mexico resulting from its war on organized drug traffickers to estimate the effect of drug-related homicides on house prices. We use an unusually rich dataset that provides national coverage on house prices and homicides and exploit within-municipality variations. We find that the impact of violence on housing prices is borne entirely by the poor sectors of the population. An increase in homicides equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 3% decrease in the price of low-income housing. In spite of this large burden on the poor, the willingness to pay in order to reverse the increase in drug-related crime is not high. We estimate it to be approximately 0.1% of Mexico's GDP. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series: Working Paper 20067: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20067.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20067.pdf Shelf Number: 132248 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeEconomics of CrimeHomicideHousing |
Author: Meyer, Maureen Title: At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State Summary: In this joint WOLA-BFDPP policy brief, the authors provide an overview of current and past drug policies implemented by the Mexican government, with a focus on its law enforcement efforts. It analyzes the trends in the increased reliance on the Mexican armed forces in counter-drug activities and the role that the United States government has played in shaping Mexico's counter-drug efforts. It is argued that government responses that are dominated by law enforcement and militarization do little to address the issue in the long term and draw attention away from the fundamental reforms to the police and justice systems that are needed to combat public security problems in the country. The brief also argues that the most effective way to address drug trafficking and its related problem is through increased efforts to curb the demand for illicit drugs in the United States and Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America/Beckley Foundation, 2007. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper 13: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BriefingPaper13.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BriefingPaper13.pdf Shelf Number: 147749 Keywords: Drug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceIllicit Drugs |
Author: Eventon, Ross Title: Eyes Wide Shut: Corruption and Drug-Related Violence in Rosario Summary: Drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon in the Argentinian city of Rosario. Since the 1990s, and largely under the public radar, the distribution of illicit drugs in the poor, peripheral neighbourhoods of the city has been managed by family-run gangs and small-time dealers; poverty and social marginalisation have facilitated the trade; young gang members, known as soldados, have fought over territory; local demand for illegal drugs has provided the engine; illicit profits have been laundered in collaboration with local lawyers and financial advisors; and corruption among the police and local officials has ensured that the main traffickers, while their identities are widely known, can operate with few concerns other than threats from rivals. This last element appears to explain why, until the issue was forced into the public domain, there had been a conspicuous lack of political concern with drug trafficking in the city. The change came on New Year's Day 2012. That day, three community activists were shot and killed in the Villa Moreno neighbourhood by gang members who mistook them for rivals. The killings were not unique, but the victims were: unlike the usual casualties, the activists had a movement behind them. Their deaths led to local demonstrations and calls for action. The press and local officials were suddenly impelled to pay attention to drug trafficking and related violence. Since then, a spate of official investigations has deepened public understanding of the nature of the drug trade in the city. They have also provided further evidence of the complicity of the security forces and the negligence of the state that have long been known to facilitate trafficking. Recommendations - Maintain the focus on the leadership of the most powerful and violent gangs, including following the money trail, and reverse the trend where simply increasing the number of security forces in violent areas is considered a sufficient policy response. - Re-focus the judiciary away from a two-tiered approach: recognize underage gang members as a vulnerable population, and that confronting the culture of violence will require special initiatives. - Root out corruption in the local and provincial security forces, recognise the way the state's approach facilitates this complicity, and produce more reliable statistics to better inform policymakers. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Series on Drug Markets and Violence, Nr 1: Accessed May 10, 2014 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv1.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Argentina URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv1.pdf Shelf Number: 132314 Keywords: CorruptionDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesIllegal DrugsPovertyViolent Crime |
Author: Dube, Oeindrila Title: From Maize to Haze: Agricultural Shocks and the Growth of the Mexican Drug Sector Summary: We examine how commodity price shocks experienced by rural producers affect the drug trade in Mexico. Our analysis exploits exogenous movements in the Mexican maize price stemming from weather conditions in U.S. maize-growing regions, as well as export flows of other major maize producers. Using data on over 2,200 municipios spanning 1990-2010, we show that lower prices differentially increased the cultivation of both marijuana and opium poppies in municipios more climatically suited to growing maize. This increase was accompanied by differentially lower rural wages, suggesting that households planted more drug crops in response to the decreased income generating potential of maize farming. We also found impacts on downstream drug-trade outcomes, including the operations of drug cartels and killings perpetrated by these criminal groups. Our findings demonstrate that maize price changes contributed to the burgeoning drug trade in Mexico, and point to the violent consequences of an expanding drug sector. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2014. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 355: Accessed May 12, 2014 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/maize-haize-agricultural-shocks-growth-mexican-drug-sector_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/maize-haize-agricultural-shocks-growth-mexican-drug-sector_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132330 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking (Mexico) Drug-Related ViolenceIllicit Drugs |
Author: Baradaran, Shima Title: Drugs and Violence Summary: The war on drugs has increased the United States prison population by tenfold. The foundation for the war on drugs and unparalleled increase in prisoners rely on the premise that drugs and violence are linked. Politicians, media, and scholars continue to advocate this view either explicitly or implicitly. This Article identifies the pervasiveness of this premise, and debunks the link between drugs and violence. It demonstrates that a connection between drugs and violence is not supported by historical arrest data, current research, or independent empirical evidence. That there is little evidence to support the assumption that drugs cause violence is an important insight, because the assumed causal link between drugs and violence forms the foundation of a significant amount of case law, statutes, and commentary. In particular, the presumed connection between drugs and violence has reduced constitutional protections, misled government resources, and resulted in the unnecessary incarceration of a large proportion of non-violent Americans. In short, if drugs do not cause violence - and the empirical evidence discussed in this Article suggests they do not - then America needs to rethink its entire approach to drug policy. Details: Salt Lake City, UT: S.J. Quinney College of Law, 2014. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 75: Accessed May 12, 2014 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2414202 Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2414202 Shelf Number: 132339 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug PolicyDrug-Related ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Feilding, Amanda Title: Illicit Drugs Markets and Dimensions of Violence in Guatemala Summary: At this civil society meeting, Amanda Feilding presented the Beckley Foundation's latest report on the impact of the illegal drug trade in Guatemala. Titled 'Illicit Drug Markets and Dimensions of Violence in Guatemala', the report looks at socio-economic indicators while exploring Guatemala's illicit drugs market. It makes evidence-informed policy recommendations based on the Beckley Foundation Latin American Chapter's original research. The Beckley Foundation Latin American Chapter outlined reform and public engagement tactics that we hope will lead to public-health minded alternative approaches to the War on Drugs. Details: Oxford, UK: Beckley Foundation, 2013. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2014 at: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/Illicit-Drug-Markets.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/Illicit-Drug-Markets.pdf Shelf Number: 132343 Keywords: Drug Markets (Guatemala)Drug OffendersDrug PolicyDrug-Related ViolenceIllegal TradeIllicit DrugsWar on Drugs |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: Corridor of Violence: the Guatemala-Honduras Border Summary: Competition between criminal groups over drug routes has made the frontier between Guatemala and Honduras one of the most violent areas in Central America, with murder rates among the highest in the world. In the absence of effective law enforcement, traffickers have become de facto authorities in some sectors. Crisis Group's latest report, Corridor of Violence: The Guatemala-Honduras Border, examines the regional dynamics that have allowed criminal gangs to thrive and outlines the main steps necessary to prevent further violence as well as to advance peaceful economic and social development. The report's major findings and recommendations are: - The border corridor includes hotly contested routes for transporting drugs to the U.S. Traffickers, with their wealth and firepower, dominate some portions. On both sides of the border, violence, lawlessness and corruption are rampant, poverty rates and unemployment are high, and citizens lack access to state services. - The arrest of local drug lords has been a mixed blessing to local populations, as the fracturing of existing groups has allowed a new generation of sometimes more violent criminals to emerge. - To prevent further violence, an urgent shift in national policies is needed. The governments should send not just troops and police to border regions, but also educators, community organisers and social and health workers. If criminal structures are to be disrupted and trust in the state restored, these regions need credible, legitimate actors - public and private - capable of providing security, accountability, jobs and hope for the future. - Guatemala and Honduras should learn from other countries facing similar security threats. The Borders for Prosperity Plan in Colombia and the Binational Border Plan in Ecuador and Peru can serve as examples for economic and social development in insecure areas. The U.S., Latin American countries and multilateral organisations should provide funds, training and technical support to embattled border communities to help them prevent violence and strengthen local institutions via education and job opportunities. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Report No. 52: Accessed June 16, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/Guatemala/052-corridor-of-violence-the-guatemala-honduras-border.pdf Shelf Number: 132467 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal NetworksDrug ControlDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsOrganized CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Schultze-Kraft, Markus Title: Getting Real About an Illicit 'External Stressor': Transnational Cocaine Trafficking through West Africa Summary: Concerns over West Africa's increasingly prominent role as transhipment point of South American cocaine en route to Europe are mounting. Gathering pace in the mid-2000s, large-scale drug trafficking has been associated with recent episodes of political instability and violence in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Mali. It is also perceived as a serious threat to democratic institutions, governance and development in other, more stable countries of the region, such as Ghana; and as potentially contributing to reversing the hard-won end to the armed conflicts that ravaged Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet it is crucial to recognise that cocaine trafficking through West Africa has thus far not resulted in levels of violence comparable to those witnessed in several Latin American drug source and transit countries. The big policy challenge for West Africa is therefore not to curb the flow of cocaine through the region in order to reduce trafficking-related violence, but to effectively tackle the negative impacts - both existing and potential - of the illegal trade on governance and development in the region's weak, unstable and impoverished states. Conventional drug control strategies, oriented towards law enforcement, are not well suited to help with this. Bold new policy responses are called for. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2014. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Evidence Report no. 72: Accessed June 18, 2014 at: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3966/ER72%20Getting%20Real%20About%20an%20Illicit%20External%20Stressor%20Transnational%20Cocaine%20Trafficking%20Through%20West%20Africa.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3966/ER72%20Getting%20Real%20About%20an%20Illicit%20External%20Stressor%20Transnational%20Cocaine%20Trafficking%20Through%20West%20Africa.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 132504 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence |
Author: Borda, Sandra Title: The Search for a Negotiated Peace in Colombia and the Fight Against Illegal Drugs Summary: The issue of illicit drugs has played a radically different role in the ongoing peace talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana compared with the peace process in El Caguan ten years ago. There are two differences. Firstly, while in El Caguan President Pastrana aligned himself with the war on drugs as it stood at the time through the design and implementation of Plan Colombia in order to strengthen the state's military apparatus, President Santos has adopted a more revisionist attitude by calling for a global debate intended to produce changes to the current war on drugs. And secondly, in contrast to Pastrana, Santos has chosen not to dwell on claims about the close links between the FARC's insurgent activity and the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Additionally, the report suggests that these differences are explained by the role the U.S. played in both negotiations: while it was active and crucial in El Caguan, its absence from the Havana talks has been notable, but also rather convenient. This absence, in turn, is explained by the fact that Washington has fewer interests at stake and more limited resources for intervening, at the same time as the Colombian government no longer has an urgent need for aid. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2013. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2014 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/8927ac64693ffbc3b7191d6b5b132d3e.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/8927ac64693ffbc3b7191d6b5b132d3e.pdf Shelf Number: 132700 Keywords: Drug EnforcementDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal Drugs (Colombia)Revolutionary Armed Forces of ColombiaWar on Drugs |
Author: Rios Contreras, Viridiana Title: How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: The causes of Mexico's Drug War Summary: This work advances a theory about corruption, criminal organizations, and violence to show how political institutions set incentives and constraints that lead criminal organizations behave, organize, compromise or fight one another. It is my argument that the propensity of criminal groups to deploy violence increases when formal or informal political institutions are decentralized because violent criminal organizations are less likely to be punished. Under decentralized institutional environments, understood here as those in which different levels of government fail to act cohesively as a single decision-making body, corruption agreements with one government inhibit law enforcement operations conducted by another. As a result, belligerent criminal organizations that would otherwise be punished remain untouched. My argument sheds light on why many criminal organizations are able to operate profitably without major episodes of violence, and illuminates the causes of Mexico's large increases in drug{related violence. A formal model (Chapter 2), an analytical narrative (Chapter 3), and an empirical test (Chapter 4 and 5) show that Mexican drug trafficking organizations increased their propensity to engage in injurious behavior only recently, responding to incentives set by political decentralization that inhibited Mexico's federal government from controlling the actions of its local governments, and thus from limiting trafficker's propensity to battle for turf. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2012. 233p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 25, 2014 at: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_PhDDissertation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/files/Rios_PhDDissertation.pdf Shelf Number: 132772 Keywords: Drug Control PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug Wars (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Organization of American States Title: An Exploratory Study on Drugs and Violence in an Intentional Sample of Women in Twelve Countries of the Americas Summary: Purpose To analyze the similarities and differences of the individual and collective experiences of women participating in an exploratory study in 10 Spanish-speaking countries of America, Brazil and the US (English, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking Latin women), in respect to drug use, violence and sexual risk behavior. Overall goal To analyze the experiences and perceptions of women participating in the study on the use and abuse of drugs, victimization by violence and sexually risk behavior, as well as to identify and evaluate the state of self esteem, depression and psychological abuse of the same. Specific Goals - Determine the frequency of drug use, violence and sexual risk behavior among women participating in the survey. - Describe and evaluate the state of self-esteem, depression and psychological abuse, as well as the level of drug abuse, types of violence among under and over eighteen year olds and the sexual risk behavior, especially HIV/AIDS among women participating in the sample. - Identify the individual and collective experiences relating to drug use, violence and sexual risk behavior in women participating in the exploratory study sample of 10 Spanish-speaking countries of Americas, Brazil, and the US (English, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking Latin women). Design and Methodology A quantitative and qualitative approach was adopted, in which the quantitative aspect was obtained through individual interviews based on a questionnaire, and descriptive statistics were utilized to analyze the data obtained. In the qualitative aspect, focus groups with content analysis were employed. The intentional sample comprised 660 women between the ages of 18 and 60, living in lower middle class and lower class communities in the 10 Hispanic countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), Brazil and the United States, with an average of 30 women per location. The study was conducted in the following manner: (i) In the Spanish-speaking countries, the focus groups were first organized and then on another day, individual interviews were conducted. In some of the locations in Brazil the individual interviews were conducted first, followed by the focus groups. (ii) The data obtained from the focus groups and the individual interviews were stored in a database created in each university participating in the study, prior to proceeding with the data analysis and preparation of the reports by the same universities. In countries where there was more than one participating university, one university was chosen to work with the combined data and to prepare the country report. In the case of Brazil, in particular, this stage was conducted by SENAD, which worked with five universities participating in the study. After this stage in the process, the 19 universities from Latin America and SENAD forwarded their data to the OAS/CICAD-EDRS to proceed with the analysis of the results obtained in the quantitative and qualitative components in the 12 participating countries and to prepare the final report of the exploratory study. (iii) The creation of an editorial committee with representatives from universities of Spanish-speaking Latin America , Portuguese-speaking Brazil, and the multi-lingual United States, as well as from CICAD-EDRS, SENAD/Brazil and external consultants, to assist with the preparation, revision and publication of the final report of the exploratory study. Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2009. 168p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.cicad.oas.org/reduccion_demanda/educational_development/reports/women-drugs%20ENG.pdf Year: 2009 Country: South America URL: http://www.cicad.oas.org/reduccion_demanda/educational_development/reports/women-drugs%20ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 132992 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug-Related ViolenceFemale Drug UsersRisk-Taking Behavior |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations Summary: Drug-related violence has become a very serious problem in Mexico. Of particular concern to U.S. policymakers, violent drug-trafficking organizations produce, transship, and deliver tens of billions of dollars' worth of narcotics into the United States annually. The activities of these organizations are not confined to drug trafficking; they extend to such criminal enterprises as human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, and racketeering. Then, there is the violence: Recent incidents have included assassinations of politicians and judges; attacks against rival organizations, associated civilians, and the police and other security forces; and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders. Despite the scope of the threat to Mexico's security, these groups are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. Comparison between Mexico and Colombia is a tempting and frequently made analogy and source for policy recommendations. A review of these approaches, combined with a series of historical case studies, offers a more thorough comparative assessment. Regions around the world have faced similar challenges and may hold lessons for Mexico. One point is clear, however: Mexico is not Colombia. In fact, Mexico is not particularly like any other historical case characterized by "warlordism," resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with the greatest improvements in countries facing similar challenges. A companion volume presents in-depth profiles of each of these conflicts. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 136p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z1/RAND_RR548z1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z1/RAND_RR548z1.pdf Shelf Number: 132898 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Paul, Christopher Title: Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations. Supporting Case Studies Summary: Drug-related violence has become a very serious problem in Mexico. Of particular concern to U.S. policymakers, violent drug-trafficking organizations produce, transship, and deliver tens of billions of dollars' worth of narcotics into the United States annually. The activities of these organizations are not confined to drug trafficking; they extend to such criminal enterprises as human trafficking, weapon trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, extortion, bribery, and racketeering. Then, there is the violence: Recent incidents have included assassinations of politicians and judges; attacks against rival organizations, associated civilians, and the police and other security forces; and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders. Despite the scope of the threat to Mexico's security, these groups are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. Comparison between Mexico and Colombia is a tempting and frequently made analogy and source for policy recommendations. A series of historical case studies offers a foundation for a more thorough comparative assessment. Regions around the world have faced similar challenges and may hold lessons for Mexico. One point is clear, however: Mexico is not Colombia. As the historical record shows, Mexico is not particularly like any other case characterized by "warlordism," resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with the greatest improvements in countries facing similar challenges. A companion volume describes the study's approach to assessing each historical case and presents findings from the overall analyses. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 285p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z2/RAND_RR548z2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR548z2/RAND_RR548z2.pdf Shelf Number: 132899 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico) Drug-Related Violence Homicides Organized Crime Violence Violent Crime |
Author: Damnjanovic, Jelena Title: Organised Crime and State Sovereignty: The conflict between the Mexican state and drug cartels 2006-2011 Summary: Since December 2006, the government of Mexico has been embroiled in a battle against numerous criminal organisations seeking to control territory and assure continued flow of revenue through the production and trafficking of drugs. Although this struggle has been well documented in Mexican and international media, it has not received as much scholarly attention due to the difficulties involved with assessing current phenomena. This thesis seeks to play a small part in filling that gap by exploring how and why the drug cartels in Mexico have proved a challenge to Mexico's domestic sovereignty and the state's capacity to have monopoly over the use of force, maintain effective and legitimate law enforcement, and to exercise control over its territory. The thesis will explain how the violence, corruption and subversion of the state's authority have resulted in a shift of the dynamics of power from state agents to criminal organizations in Mexico. It also suggests implications for domestic sovereignty in regions experiencing similar problems with organized crime, perhaps pointing to a wider trend in international politics in the era of globalization. Details: Sydney: University of Sydney, Department of Government and International Relations, 2011. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 11, 2014 at: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/8273 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/8273 Shelf Number: 132974 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as an Instrument of Cartel Warfare Summary: The United States has diplomatic relations with 194 independent nations. Of these, none is more important to America than Mexico in terms of trade, investment, tourism, natural resources, migration, energy, and security. In recent years, narco-violence has afflicted Mexico with more than 50,000 drug-related murders since 2007 and some 26,000 men, women, and children missing. President Enrique Pena Nieto has tried to divert national attention from the bloodshed through reforms in energy, education, anti-hunger, health-care, and other areas. Even though the death rate has declined since the chief executive took office on December 1, 2012, other crimes continue to plague his nation. Members of the business community report continual extortion demands; the national oil company PEMEX suffers widespread theft of oil, gas, explosives, and solvents (with which to prepare methamphetamines); hundreds of Central American migrants have shown up in mass graves; and the public identifies the police with corruption and villainy. Washington policymakers, who overwhelmingly concentrate on Asia and the Mideast, would be well-advised to focus on the acute dangers that lie principally below the Rio Grande, but whose deadly avatars are spilling into our nation. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1195.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1195.pdf Shelf Number: 133040 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bunker, Robert J. Title: Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico Summary: Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel "enemy intent," a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Letort Papers: Accessed August 21, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf Shelf Number: 130006 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Time to Listen: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean Summary: The list grows longer: sitting Latin American presidents, including the United States' principal allies; past presidents; the Organization of American States; the Summit of the Americas; civil society leaders from all nations. The clamor for drug policy reform, including for a reformed U.S. drug policy in Latin America, is growing rapidly. But Washington isn't hearing it. The Obama Administration's counternarcotics strategy has continued largely unchanged. In fact, over the past few years the United States has expanded its military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies' direct involvement in counternarcotics operations in the Western Hemisphere. This has been particularly true in Central America, where it has had disturbing human rights impacts. Aid numbers do not tell the whole story. In dollar terms, assistance to most Latin American and Caribbean nations' militaries and police forces has declined since 2010, as Colombia's and Mexico's large aid packages wind down. Today, only aid to Central America is increasing significantly. For its part, the Defense Department is facing cuts and turning most of its attention to other regions. While the Pentagon's current approach to Latin America does not include major base construction or new massive aid packages, however, the United States is still providing significant amounts of aid and training to Latin America's armed forces and police. In addition to large-scale counter-drug operations, the region is seeing an increase in training visits from U.S. Special Forces, a greater presence of intelligence personnel and drones (while countries are obtaining drones, mostly not from the United States), and rapidly growing use of military and police trainers from third countries, especially Colombia. Much of what takes place may not show up as large budget amounts, but it is shrouded by secrecy, poor reporting to Congress and the public, and a migration of programs' management from the State Department to the Defense Department. A lack of transparency leads to a lack of debate about consequences and alternatives, for human rights, for civil-military relations, and for the United States' standing in the region. On human rights, the Obama Administration has been occasionally willing to raise tough issues with allies. It has encouraged trials in civilian, not military, courts for soldiers accused of committing gross human rights abuses, especially in Mexico and Colombia. It has supported the Rios Montt genocide trial in Guatemala, and has sided with countries and human rights groups that seek to maintain, not weaken, the current Inter-American human rights system. Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and Washington Office on Latin America, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2014 at: http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Time_to_Listen-Trends_in_U.S._Security_Assistance_to_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Central America URL: http://lawg.org/storage/documents/Time_to_Listen-Trends_in_U.S._Security_Assistance_to_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf Shelf Number: 131150 Keywords: Drug Control PolicyDrug EnforcementDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHuman Rights AbusesWar on Drugs (Central America) |
Author: Enamorado, Ted Title: Crime and Growth Convergence: Evidence from Mexico Summary: Scholars have often argued that crime deters growth, but the empirical literature assessing such effect is scarce. By exploiting cross-municipality income and crime data for Mexico - a country that experienced a high increase in crime rates over the past decade - this study circumvents two of the most common problems faced by researchers in this area. These are: (i) the lack of a homogenous, consistently comparable measure of crime and (ii) the small sample problem in the estimation. Combining income data from poverty maps, administrative records on crime and violence, and public expenditures data at the municipal level for Mexico (2005-2010), the analysis finds evidence indicating that drug-related crimes indeed deter growth. It also finds no evidence of a negative effect on growth from crimes unrelated to drug trafficking. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 2013. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Research Working Paper No. 6730: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6730 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6730 Shelf Number: 133906 Keywords: Crime Rates (Mexico)Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomic AnalysisPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Carvajal, Roger A. Title: Violence in Honduras: An Analysis of the Failure in Public Security and the State's Response to Criminality Summary: The incidence of violence in Honduras currently is the highest in Honduran history. In 2014, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported the Honduras homicide rate, at 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, as the highest in the world for nations outside of war. It is the foundation of this thesis that the Honduran security collapse is due to unresolved internal factors - political, economic, and societal - as well as the influence of foreign factors and actors - the evolution of the global illicit trade. Two of the most important areas affecting public security in Honduras are the challenges posed by transnational organized crime and the relative weakness and fragility of the Honduran state to provide basic needs and security to the population. The emergence of criminal gangs and drug traffickers, and the government's security policies, are all factors that have worsened public security. The crime environment has overwhelmed the police, military, judicial system and overcrowded the prison system with mostly juvenile petty delinquents. Moreover, with a high impunity rate of nearly 95 percent for homicides, killing in Honduras has become an activity without consequences. The latest state's response is with re-militarization of security, highlighting the dilemma of the challenges of combatting internal violence and transnational organized crime in a weak state. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 10, 2014 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42596/14Jun_Carvajal_Roger.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Honduras URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/42596/14Jun_Carvajal_Roger.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 133901 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolence (Honduras)Violent Crime |
Author: Goodhand, Jonathan Title: Drugs, (dis)order and agrarian change: the political economy of drugs and its relevance to international drug policy Summary: In May 2014 the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) hosted a workshop, co-funded by NOREF and Christian Aid, designed to facilitate dialogue between scholars working on the political economy of drugs, conflict and development in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The workshop explored how political economy perspectives, derived from long-term empirical research on drugs-affected regions, can enhance understanding of, and policy responses to, drug production and trafficking. This approach, rather than seeing drugs as "exceptional" and "criminal", seeks to situate the role of illicit economies within broader processes of state formation and agrarian change. Contributions to the workshop revealed the highly differentiated and context-specific dynamics of drug economies, and how different configurations of institutions and security markets can lead to different kinds of relationships between drugs, state-building, agrarian change and development. This research does not lend itself to simple policy narratives or prescriptions, but it does suggest that there can be no universal and de-contextualised solutions to "the drug problem". Dogmatic and irreconcilable positions, adopted by both those advocating harsher prohibition and those arguing for blanket decriminalisation, fail to reflect sufficiently on the impacts such policies will have on drug-producing countries. A more grounded, comparative perspective is urgently needed in an arena where policies are often anything but evidence based and where data are patchy or politicised. Counter-narcotic (CN) strategies, based on a reification of the perceived linkages between drugs, instability and state fragility, often provide only a partial, and in some cases deeply misleading, insight into the economic and political orders that emerge around drug production. Political economy provides a corrective to these deeply entrenched biases and blind spots, by incorporating an analysis of aspects of drug economies and counter narcotics (CN) strategies that are frequently treated as residual or circumvented, including the varying levels and types of violence surrounding drug economies; the complex motives of those involved in drug production and trafficking; the linkages between licit and illicit commodities in processes of agrarian transformation; the potential developmental outcomes of drugs economies; the relationship between illicit economies and differing configurations of authority and rule; and a socially differentiated account of who gains and who loses from counter-narcotics policies. In doing so, political economy approaches provide a powerful analytical lens for developing a more contextually attuned public policy on drugs. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Publication: Accessed November 4, 2014 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/6ae957894148ed319a377eee7c775065.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/6ae957894148ed319a377eee7c775065.pdf Shelf Number: 133967 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceIllegal Drugs |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Changing the Game or Dropping the Ball? Mexico's Security and Anti-Crime Strategy under President Enrique Pena Nieto Summary: ANALYSIS - Even as the administration of Mexico's President Enrique Pena Nieto has scored important reform successes in the economic sphere, its security and law enforcement policy toward organized crime remains incomplete and ill-defined. Preoccupied with the fighting among vicious drug trafficking groups and the rise of anti-crime vigilante militias in the center of Mexico, the administration has for the most part averted its eyes from the previously highly-violent criminal hotspots in the north where major law enforcement challenges remain. - The Pena Nieto administration thus mostly continues to put out immediate security fires - such as in Michoacan and Tamaulipas - but the overall deterrence capacity of Mexico's military and law enforcement forces and justice sector continue to be very limited and largely unable to deter violence escalation and reescalation. - Identifying the need to reduce violence in Mexico as the most important priority for its security policy was the right decision of the Pena Nieto administration. But despite the capture of Mexico's most notorious drug trafficker, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, much of the security policy reform momentum that surrounded the Pena Nieto administration at the outset of its six-year term has prematurely dissipated. Key pillars of the policy are plodding along meekly, including the national gendarmerie, the new intelligence supercenter, and the mando unico. The October 2013 deadline to vet all police units for corruption and links to organized crime was missed once again and extended until October 2014. As with many institutional reforms in Mexico, there is large regional variation in the quality and even design of the reforms being implemented. At least, however, the Mexican Congress, overall a weak player in setting and overseeing anti-crime policy in Mexico, approved a new criminal code in the spring of 2014. The so-called National Code of Penal Procedure (Codigo Nacional de Procedimientos Penales) will be critical in establishing uniform application of criminal law across Mexico's thirty-one states and the Federal District, and standardizing procedures regarding investigations, trials, and punishment. - Instead of pushing ahead with institutional reforms, the Pena Nieto administration has highlighted poor coordination among national security agencies and local and national government units as a crucial cause of the rise of violent crime in Mexico. It has thus defined improving coordination as a key aspect of its anti-crime approach. - Despite its rhetoric and early ambitions, the Pena Nieto administration fell straight back not only into relying on the Mexican military in combination with the Federal Police to cope with criminal violence, but also doing so belatedly and with an essentially analogous lack of planning and prepositioning, and with essentially the same operational design as the previous Felipe Calderon administration. - Although homicides, including those perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), have decreased in Mexico, the drop did not reach the 50% reduction in the first six months in office that the Pena Nieto administration had promised. Moreover, in various parts of Mexico, the violence reduction cannot be necessarily attributed to government policies, but rather is the outcome of new balances of power being established among criminal groups in previously highly contested hotspots. Many of these balances of power among the DTOs had emerged already in the last years of the Felipe Calderon administration. In these areas of newly established criminal control and deterrence, even kidnapping and extortion might be leveling off and becoming more predictable, even as they are overall on the rise in Mexico. - In its security and law enforcement efforts, the Pena Nieto administration has largely slipped into many of the same policies of President Felipe Calderon. In particular, the current administration has adopted the same non-strategic high-value targeting that defined the previous administration. Perhaps with the exception of targeting the Zetas and Los Caballeros Templarios, this interdiction posture mostly continues to be undertaken on a non-strategic basis as opportunistic intelligence becomes available and without forethought, planning, and prepositioning to avoid new dangerous cycles of violence and renewed contestation among local drug trafficking groups. This development is partially the outcome of institutional inertia in the absence of an alternative strategy, and of operational simplicity, compared to, for example, a more effective but also more demanding policy of middle-level targeting. - Importantly, the Pena Nieto administration has sought to pay greater attention to and respect for human rights issues, such as by allowing civilian claims of human rights violations by Mexico's military forces to be tried in civilian courts and establishing a victims' compensation fund. But the efforts to increase rule of law, justice, and the protection of human rights and to reduce impunity and corruption remain very much a work in progress, with the government's resolve, policies, and outcomes varying widely among Mexico's states. - The Pena Nieto administration's focus on socio-economic anti-crime policies and other crime prevention measures is highly laudable. But its signature anti-crime socio-economic approach - the so-called poligonos program - has not been well-operationalized and is not integrated with law enforcement efforts. The discreet efforts remain scattered. The theory, implementation, and monitoring parameters of the national crime prevention strategy are not yet adequately worked out. These deficiencies undermine the program's effectiveness and risk dissipating the dedicated yet relatively small resources allocated to the effort as well as the effort's energy. Monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of socio-economic anti-crime efforts, including the poligonos approach, is particularly weak and nebulous. Details: Washington, DC: Latin American Initiative, Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2014. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20felbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20felbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf Shelf Number: 134070 Keywords: Criminal Justice PolicyCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesKidnappingOrganized CrimeViolence (Mexico)Violent Crime |
Author: Day, Marcus Title: Making a mountain out of a molehill: myths on youth and crime in Saint Lucia Summary: This report reflects a short summary of one year (2012) of ethnographic observations and 'informal conversations' with various stakeholders across Saint Lucia, a small Caribbean nation. The effort was undertaken to assess the profile of youth gangs and their members in order to add depth to existing analysis on gangs in the Caribbean by using one country as a model. This summary of the report focuses on the interaction between the cannabis and cocaine markets, and the role of youth in that trade on the one hand, and the increase in violence indicators on the other. The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and individual member states face shared challenges of youth involvement in crime, violence, gangs and other anti-social activities. It is not uncommonly heard the "drug problem" is to be blamed for this. This briefing wants to show this relation is far more complex and often misunderstood. Saint Lucia is a small island state, one of the fifteen members of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). It became independent from the United Kingdom in 1979, and is situated in the south eastern part of the Caribbean and has a population of around 180 thousand. The Caribbean region, due to its proximity to cocaine producers in the South and its well established trading links with Europe and North America is well positioned as a transit zone, accounting for an estimated 25-30 per cent of cocaine reaching Europe. The main destination for the bulk of cocaine transiting Saint Lucia is Martinique and onward to Paris and beyond. The isolated coast lines and island geography contribute to the popularity of the sub region for the transhipment of cocaine. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Series on Drug Markets and Violence, Nr 3: Accessed April 6, 2015 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv3-e.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Caribbean URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dmv3-e.pdf Shelf Number: 135160 Keywords: CocaineDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence |
Author: Lessing, Benjamin Title: The Logic of Violence in Drug Wars: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia Summary: Why have militarized interventions to curtail violence by drug cartels had wildly divergent results? In the past six years, state crackdowns drove a nine-fold increase in cartel-state violence in Mexico, versus a two-thirds decrease in Brazil. Prevailing analyses of drug wars as a criminal subtype of insurgency provide little traction, because they elide differences in rebels' and cartels' aims. Cartels, I argue, fight states not to conquer territory or political control, but to coerce state actors and influence policy outcomes. The empirically predominant channel is violent corruption-threatening enforcers while negotiating bribes. A formal model reveals that greater state repression raises bribe prices, leading cartels to fight back whenever (a) corruption is sufficiently rampant, and (b) repression is insufficiently conditional on cartels' use of violence. Variation in conditionality helps explain observed outcomes: switching to conditional repression pushed Brazilian cartels into nonviolent strategies, while Mexico's war "without distinctions" inadvertently made fighting advantageous. Details: Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development, Stanford University, 2013. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper no. 145: Accessed April 20, 2015 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/145.Violent_Corruption_CDDRL_Working_Paper.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/145.Violent_Corruption_CDDRL_Working_Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 135319 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug WarsDrug-Related Violence |
Author: Jenson, Weston Thayne Title: Breaking bad: U.S.-Mexican counterdrug offensive, the Merida initiative and beyond Summary: In the study of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, there exists a fundamental challenge to counterdrug operations; the underlying socioeconomic foundation of narco-trafficking. I argue that the historical and current practice of merely relying on military and law enforcement aid is not sufficient when it comes to addressing this socioeconomic foundation of narco-trafficking and transnational crime organizations (TCOs). Using a rational policy model, the analysis evaluates the Merida Initiative's effectiveness at inhibiting drug trafficking operations and decreasing drug-related violence. After demonstrating the ineffectiveness of current counterdrugs policies, this project evaluates three options for future U.S.-Mexico security cooperation utilizing the same criteria used to evaluate the Merida Initiative. The prerogative of this project is to demonstrate the need for a comprehensive plan that both addresses bilateral security needs as well as the underlying social foundation of narco-trafficking in order to be successful in the ongoing Mexican Narco-War. Details: Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/13521 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/13521 Shelf Number: 135761 Keywords: Drug EnforcementDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceMerida InitiativeWar on Drugs |
Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Mexico's Disappeared: The Enduring Cost of a Crisis Ignored Summary: When Enrique Pena Nieto took office in December 2012, he inherited a country reeling from an epidemic of drug violence. The "war on drugs" launched by his predecessor, Felipe Calderon, had not only failed to reduce violence, but also led to a dramatic increase in human rights violations. Throughout most of his presidency, Calderon denied abuses had occurred and failed to take adequate steps to ensure they were prosecuted. That responsibility now falls to President Enrique Pena Nieto. And nowhere is it more urgent than in the crime of disappearances: where people have been unlawfully taken against their will and their fate is still unknown. Mexico's Disappeared documents nearly 250 "disappearances." In 149 of these cases, evidence suggests that these were enforced disappearances, carried out with the participation of state agents. In virtually all of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, authorities failed to promptly and thoroughly search for the disappeared person, instead blaming the victim and passing the responsibility to investigate onto families. The limited investigative steps prosecutors took were undermined by delays, errors, and omissions. These lapses only exacerbate the suffering of victims' families, for whom not knowing what happened to their loved ones is a source of perpetual anguish. Another path is possible. In the state of Nuevo Leon, responding to pressure from victims' families and human rights defenders, prosecutors have broken with a pattern of inaction and begun to seriously investigate a select group of disappearances. While progress thus far has been limited, it is an encouraging first step. Ultimately, enforced disappearances are a national problem, and the success of state-level efforts will depend in large measure on whether the federal government is willing and able to do its part. If, like its predecessor, the Pena Nieto administration fails to implement a comprehensive strategy to find the missing and bring perpetrators to justice, it will only worsen the most severe crisis of enforced disappearance in Latin America in decades. Details: New York: HRW, 2013. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0213_ForUpload_0_0_0.pdf Shelf Number: 127733 Keywords: DisappearancesDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesMissing PersonsMurdersWar on Drugs |
Author: Simmons, Krista Title: The State and Youth Violence:A Socio-Political Approach to Understanding Youth Violence in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas Summary: Drug trafficking has drastically increased levels of violence in Rio de Janeiro since the arrival of the cocaine trade in the early 1980's. The rate of homicides in Rio de Janeiro in the late 1990's and early 2000's marked the city as one of the most violent urban centers in the world. Even today, there is an average of 20 homicides each day in Rio de Janeiro, a city of just under 12,000,000 people. The rate of death as a result of violence and other demographic factors such as an overabundance of male recorded deaths between the ages of 15-24, a deficit of young men, an imbalanced sex ratio, and a rise in youth mortality since the 1980's more closely mirror warzone demographics than those of a city in a modern, stable state such as Brazil. For example, between 1998 and 2000 there were between 2,000 and 5,000 violent deaths, in Yugoslavia, and roughly 11,000 in Angola. In the same period, Rio de Janeiro saw 7,465 citizens die as a result of violence. Of grave concern to children's rights activists has been the accompanying spike in violence against and among children and youth. Deaths by external causes among individuals under 18 years of age in Rio de Janeiro have increased from 8.1% in 1979 to 26.4% in 2002, with violent causes predominating external causes of death increasingly with time. The increased involvement of children in violent drug gangs is reflected in the testimony of local favela dwellers (or favelados), as well as Rio de Janeiro crime statistics. In 1980, there were 110 registered convictions of minors for drug related crime. By 2001, there were 1,584 convictions of minors for drug related crimes: a number shocking, although decreased from a high of 3,211 in 1998. This translates to a 1340% increase in drug related convictions among minors in Rio de Janeiro between 1980 and 2001. It is estimated that 5,000-6,000 children are currently working for drug factions within Rio de Janeiro's favelas (poor shanty towns). The realities faced by youth involved in organized drug violence in Rio de Janeiro are similar to those of child soldiers elsewhere in the world, with whom they share the dynamics of "voluntary" recruitment, a hierarchical structure of orders and punishment, access to and use of firearms and other weapons, kill-or-be-killed surroundings, and involvement in large-scale armed confrontations. Despite the similarities, however, the children of Rio's drug gangs cannot be classified as child soldiers because the drug factions for which they work have no political objectives or desire to replace the state. Furthermore, labeling them child soldiers runs the risk of legitimizing lethal state force against them. However, these children are clearly more than "delinquents." A call for a category all their own has grown in recent years, with Brazilian NGO, Viva Rio, developing a working definition for these children which can be applied in similar circumstances around the world: "Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV) - Children and Youth employed or otherwise participating in Organized Armed Violence where there are elements of command structure and power over territory, local population, or resources." Details: Washington, DC: American University, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://auislandora-dev.wrlc.org/islandora/object/0910capstones%3A108 Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://auislandora-dev.wrlc.org/islandora/object/0910capstones%3A108 Shelf Number: 129786 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceFavelasHomicidesUrban AreasViolenceViolent CrimeYouth GangsYouth Violence |
Author: Carvalho, Ilona Szabo de Title: Citizen security rising: new approaches to addressing drugs, guns and violence in Latin America Summary: Many Latin American states are facing epidemic levels of organised and interpersonal violence. This violence is attributed to a number of risk factors, even if the illegal drugs trade and punitive responses to trafficking are widely credited with being the principle drivers. Yet while trafficking in narcotics is commonly associated with insecurity, weakening governance and underdevelopment, drugs as such are not the central problem. Rather, it is competition between criminal factions for control over the trade and a protracted "war" declared against drugs that have ratcheted up insecurity from Mexico to Brazil. The outcomes of this four-decade-long war are at best uneven, with gains in one country overshadowed by severe declines in others. More optimistically, a regional debate is under way that is challenging the status quo with a more concerted focus on prevention and demand reduction. Latin American societies are beginning to explore alternative approaches to drug control tailored to regional and national needs and priorities. There is a visible shift toward a discourse that emphasises prevention and treats consumption as a public health issue, focuses repression on the most violent criminal organisations and redirects law enforcement toward harm reduction. The hope is that this may presage a turn toward investment in policies that are animated more by evidence than ideology. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF): 2013. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/061bc30adffa795e6a5e43bf664c8666.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/061bc30adffa795e6a5e43bf664c8666.pdf Shelf Number: 129717 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeGun ViolenceWar on Drugs |
Author: Eguizabal, Cristina Title: Crime and Violence in Central America's Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, Hurting, and Can Be Improved Summary: Throughout the spring and summer of 2014, a wave of unaccompanied minors and families from Central America began arriving at the U.S.-Mexican border in record numbers. During June and July over 10,000 a month were arriving. The unexpected influx triggered a national debate about immigration and border policy, as well as an examination of the factors compelling thousands of children to undertake such a treacherous journey. Approximately two-thirds of these children are from Central America's Northern Triangle-El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. According to interviews with the children their motives for migrating ranged from fleeing some of the world's highest homicide rates, rampant extortion, communities controlled by youth gangs, domestic violence, impunity for most crimes, as well as economic despair and lack of opportunity. Many hoped to reunite with family members, especially parents, who are already in the United States. The wave of migrants has underscored chronic problems in the region that stem back decades. It is often assumed that international drug trafficking explains the surge in violence since 2009, but other important factors are also at play. Drug trafficking is certainly a factor, especially in areas where criminal control of territory and trafficking routes is contested, but drugs do not explain the entirety of the complex phenomenon. Other factors have also contributed. While there are important differences among the three countries, there are also common factors behind the violence. Strong gang presence in communities often results in competition for territorial and economic control through extortion, kidnapping and the retail sale of illegal drugs. Threats of violence and sexual assault are often tools of neighborhood control, and gang rivalries and revenge killings are commonplace. Elevated rates of domestic abuse, sexual violence, and weak family and household structures also contribute as children are forced to fend for themselves and often chose (or are coerced into) the relative "safety" of the gang or criminal group. Likewise, important external factors such a weak capacity among law enforcement institutions, elevated levels of corruption, and penetration of the state by criminal groups means impunity for crime is extraordinarily high (95 percent or more), and disincentives to criminal activity are almost non-existent. Public confidence in law enforcement is low and crime often goes unreported. U.S. policy and practice are also a major contributing factor to the violence. U.S. consumption of illegal drug remains among the highest in the world, and U.S. and Mexican efforts to interdict drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Mexico has contributed to the trade's relocation to Central America. Furthermore, the policy of deporting large numbers of young Central Americans in the 1990s and 2000s, many of them already gang members in the United States, helped transfer the problem of violent street gangs from the United States to Central America's northern triangle. El Salvador now has the largest number of gang members in Central America followed close behind by Honduras and Guatemala. Finally, the trafficking of firearms, especially from the United States, has also contributed to the lethality and morbidity of crime. Efforts to slow firearms trafficking from the United States have encountered many domestic and political barriers and continue largely unchecked. Over the past year, the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program has undertaken an extensive review of the principal United States security assistance program for the region-the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This review has focused on the major security challenges in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and how CARSI seeks to address these. This publication includes country reports on each country including a review of the current in-country security context, as well as assessing CARSI's effectiveness for addressing these challenges. The report also includes a chapter providing an in-depth analysis of the geographic distribution of homicides and an examination of how such an analysis can help policy makers design more effective targeted strategies to lower violence. A final chapter outlining policy options for the future completes the report. Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015. 155p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Shelf Number: 135789 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationKidnappingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Livingston, Andrew Title: A Reputation for Violence: Fractionalization's Impact on Criminal Reputation and the Mexican State Summary: Friday night, July 8th 2011 - gunmen aligned with Los Zetas smash their way into a bar in the Northern Mexican city of Monterrey. They open fire and kill 20 people while wounding even more. The next morning, in an unrelated incident, police find 10 people shot and left to rot in an abandoned SUV. In just 24 short hours, 30 people are added to the ever-expanding casualty count. Horrific days of violence like these have become more frequent over the past few years. The Government of Mexico responds to violent organized criminal groups (OCGs) by increasing enforcement and the OCGs retaliate with brazen acts of aggressive defiance. The 15,000 that died in 2010 alone, elevates the death toll from the Mexican Drug War to around 35,000 since 2007. These huge numbers have a way of desensitizing us to the reality of death. That cannot be allowed to happen. On average, 14 sons, daughters, husbands, wives, friends and neighbors are murdered every day in the violent border city of Juarez. Fourteen died yesterday and more will perish today, tomorrow, and the day after. In an effort to reduce violence and the power of criminal organizations, US and Mexican strategy has focused primarily on removing high valued targets within an OCG's top leadership in order to fracture the organization's power structure. Mexican President Felipe Calderon believes breaking up the gangs will turn a criminal problem that threatens Mexican national security into a regional safety issue. But in the short run fragmentation causes spikes in violence because conflicts arise within and between criminal organizations. After the pre-existing power relationship disintegrates, leaders of criminal groups attempt to increase their market share by muscling out the competition. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration views this escalation in violence as "a sign of success in the fight against drugs" an instance of "caged animals, attacking one another." But this view may be oversimplified. Organized crime groups are horizontally structured for-profit criminal businesses that operate to maximize revenues gained from illegal activities. They typically engage in violence only when it serves a specific business purpose. The strategy of continually breaking apart criminal organizations has kept the balance of power from reaching a stable equilibrium. These uncertain conditions incentivize OCGs to forcefully take advantage of their rivals' unstable control over market share. But physical violence is only one way to increase market share and control competitors. Establishing a threatening reputation from past displays of violence and corrupting government officials are integral components of a combined strategy that allow an OCG to attain a dominant status within the market hierarchy without having to resort to expensive warfare. The following analysis considers criminal violence in Mexico from an economic perspective of illegal firms' incentives to build violent reputation capital. Studying the costs and benefits of utilizing violent intimidation and institutional corruption to gain an economic advantage provides an objective point from which the success or failure of the US-Mexican strategy of fragmentation can be analyzed. Reputation building by criminal organizations will be discussed in the context of their effect on the local population, the government and rival OCGs. This analysis will attempt to answer the central question of whether President Calderon's war against the organized crime groups increases violence and destabilizes the Mexican state. In the end, the continuous periods of intense violence that occur when government enforcement keeps the market destabilized perpetuates an environment where reputation must be constantly rebuilt and reaffirmed with actual displays of violence. This violent environment selects for the most aggressive and brutal leaders all while overburdening criminal justice system and eroding public confidence in the rule of law. Going after the dangerous criminals that control Mexico's illicit underworld sounds like a reasonable and responsible plan to weaken their power over the state but in the end, constantly breaking apart criminal organizations exacerbates many of the problems the government is trying to solve. Details: Hamilton, NY: Colgate University, 2011. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.colgate.edu/portaldata/imagegallerywww/096e1793-d3a4-43b3-b7fa-bd595c56c799/ImageGallery/LivingstonA(1)FinalCopy.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.colgate.edu/portaldata/imagegallerywww/096e1793-d3a4-43b3-b7fa-bd595c56c799/ImageGallery/LivingstonA(1)FinalCopy.pdf Shelf Number: 135999 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolent CrimeWar on drugs |
Author: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Office of Foreign Asets Control Title: Impact Report on Economic Sanctions Against Colombia Drug Cartels Summary: Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") integrates regulatory, national security, investigative, enforcement, and intelligence elements towards a single goal: effective implementation of economic sanctions programs against foreign threats and adversaries. OFAC currently administers and enforces more than 30 economic sanctions programs pursuant to Presidential and Congressional mandates, targeting select foreign countries and regimes, terrorist organizations, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics traffickers. OFAC acts under general Presidential wartime and national emergency powers, as well as specific legislation, to prohibit transactions and freeze (or "block") assets within the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons, including their foreign branches. These programs are administered in conjunction with diplomatic, law enforcement and occasionally military action. Since 1995, the Executive Branch has developed an array of "targeted" sanctions programs that focus on drug cartels and traffickers, international terrorist groups, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, members of hostile regimes, and other individuals and groups whose activities threaten U.S. interests. Narcotics traffickers operating on a global scale require an extensive support network, including procurement, logistics, transportation, communications, security, money laundering, and other facilitation. Disguising the sometimes vast profits derived from major drug operations requires the purchase of ostensibly legitimate enterprises capable of handling business on an international scale. These illicitly funded "corporate empires" can be extensive, complex, and undermine the integrity of financial systems. They are also one of the drug cartels' greatest vulnerabilities. To combat the threats of violence, corruption, and harm posed by narcotics traffickers and their networks, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12978 in October 1995, declaring a national emergency with respect to significant foreign narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia. The impact of these sanctions has been significant and, at times, dramatic. When OFAC designates an individual or entity, any assets within the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person anywhere in the world, must be frozen. Trade with or through the United States is cut off. Moreover, many non-U.S. businesses and banks have voluntarily severed all ties with individuals and entities that OFAC has listed. As a result, designated persons may lose access to their bank accounts outside the United States, disrupting their operations and freedom of access. Finally, in many cases, Colombian authorities have taken law enforcement actions against designated companies or properties after OFAC listed them. Collectively, these actions have disrupted more than $1 billion worth of assets - in blockings, seizures, forfeitures, and the failure of enterprises - and economically isolated the individuals who own and manage the enterprises. The Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), in fact, stated that OFAC's efforts have resulted in "the forfeiture of billions of dollars worth of drug-related assets." This report reviews the SDNT program's achievements over the past 11 years, as it has targeted the leaders of Colombia's Cali, North Valle, and North Coast drug cartels. It is our hope that the report will provide a useful window into the history and achievements of this program, as well as lessons for refining sanctions targeting and implementation in the future in this and other programs. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2007. 180p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf Shelf Number: 136005 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomic Sanctions |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Injunctions to Prevent Gang-Related Violence and Gang-Related Drug Dealing: Statutory Guidance Summary: This revised statutory guidance on injunctions to prevent gang-related violence and gang-related drug dealing draws on the experience and knowledge of the police service, local authorities and a wide range of local partners involved in dealing with violent gangs. It has been developed and approved by partners across the Criminal Justice System, as well as local practitioners. It has been produced after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, and has been laid before Parliament by the Home Secretary. The Policing and Crime Act 2009 ('the 2009 Act') contains provisions for injunctions to prevent gang-related violence and gang-related drug dealing activity to be sought against an individual; these were commenced in January 2011. The Crime and Security Act 2010 contains provisions for breach of an injunction to be enforced against 14 to 17 year olds; the Crime and Courts Act 2013 moved jurisdiction for these proceedings from the County Court to the Youth Court. The Serious Crime Act 2015 contains provisions that amend the statutory definition of what comprises a "gang", as defined in section 34(5) of Part IV of the Policing and Crime Act 2009, and expands the scope of the activity a person must have engaged in, encouraged or assisted, or needs to be protected from, before a gang injunction can be imposed to include drug dealing activity. This statutory guidance is a practical tool intended to help local partners apply for and manage gang injunctions effectively and appropriately in accordance with the statutory framework. It is for: - local authorities and police forces who are seeking to apply for an injunction to prevent gang-related violence or gang-related drug dealing activity; and - local partners who may be consulted by the applicant as part of the process. These may include, but are not limited to, registered social landlords, housing associations, transport agencies, probation and youth offending teams (where the respondent is aged 14 to 17 or has recently turned 18). Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 15, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/432805/Injunctions_to_Prevent_Gang-Related_Violence_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/432805/Injunctions_to_Prevent_Gang-Related_Violence_web.pdf Shelf Number: 136060 Keywords: Civil InjunctionsDrug OffencesDrug OffendersDrug-Related ViolenceGang-Related Violence |
Author: Miraglia, Paula Title: Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies Summary: Key Findings - Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world with a national homicide rate of 27.1 per 100,000 inhabitants. A large part of this violence and criminality can be linked to arms and drug trafficking operations by organized crime groups. - Brazil's increased domestic drug consumption in recent years has affected the domestic drug market and changed the structure, profile, and modes of operation of organized crime groups. - In 2006, Brazil adopted a new drug law intended to make a clear and definitive distinction between drug users and dealers. However, a discriminatory culture in the justice system, combined with great discretion given to the authorities to classify offenses as trafficking, resulted in increased imprisonment of addicts. - Today, Brazil has the world's fourth largest imprisoned population, which points to the need for alternatives in dealing with violence and crime, particularly when related to drug consumption. - Brazil boasts innovative programs, such as the Sao Paulo de Bracos Abertos program and the Unidades de Polcia Pacificadora in Rio de Janeiro, but each of these faces complex challenges to their success. Policy Recommendations - Brazil needs criminal justice system reform, together with improved drug legislation that classifies offenses more precisely, to minimize the discretionary imprisonment of addicts. - Brazil should develop improved mechanisms to prevent police brutality and lethality, and should also adopt reforms to improve police efficiency and effectiveness. - Brazil should mainstream the concept of prevention in its domestic drug policy programs. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Miraglia--Brazil-final.pdf?la=en Year: 2015 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/Miraglia--Brazil-final.pdf?la=en Shelf Number: 136103 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: Calderon, Gabriela Title: The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico Summary: In 2006 the Mexican government launched an aggressive campaign to weaken drug- trafficking organizations (DTOs). The security policies differed significantly from those of previous administrations in the use of a leadership strategy (the targeting for arrest of the highest levels or core leadership of criminal networks). While these strategies can play an important role in disrupting the targeted criminal organization, they can also have unintended consequences, increasing inter-cartel and intra-cartel fighting and fragmenting criminal organizations. What impact do captures of senior drug cartel members have on the dynamics of drug-related violence? Does it matter if governments target drug kingpins vs. lower ranked lieutenants? We analyze whether the captures or killings of kingpins and lieutenants have increased drug-related violence and whether the violence spills over spatially. To estimate effects that are credibly causal, we use different empirical strategies that combine difference-in-differences and synthetic control group methods. We find evidence that captures or killings of drug cartel leaders have exacerbating effects not only on DTO-related violence, but also on homicides that affect the general population. Captures or killings of lieutenants, for their part, only seem to exacerbate violence in "strategic places" or municipalities located in the transportation network. While most of the effects on DTO-related violence are found in the first six months after a leader's removal, effects on homicides affecting the rest of the population are more enduring, suggesting different mechanisms through which leadership neutralizations breed violence. Details: Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, 2015. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper: Accessed July 20, 2015 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/beheading-criminal-organizations-and-dynamics-violence-mexico%E2%80%99s-drug-war Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publication/beheading-criminal-organizations-and-dynamics-violence-mexico%E2%80%99s-drug-war Shelf Number: 136109 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Reversing a fairly robust record of capturing and imprisoning leaders of Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), the escape of notorious cartel leader Joaquin El Chapo Guzman on July 11, 2015, was a huge setback for the Mexican government already beleaguered by charges of corruption and low approval ratings. Mexico's efforts to combat drug traffickers have touched all of the major organizations that once dominated the illicit drug trade: for example, the February 2014 capture of Guzman who leads Sinaloa, Mexico's largest drug franchise; top leaders of Los Zetas in 2013 and March 2015; the October 2014 arrests of Hector Beltran Leyva of the Beltran Leyva Organization and, later, of Vicente Carrillo Fuentes of the once-dominant Juarez cartel. The DTOs have been in constant flux in recent years. By some accounts, in December 2006 there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured into many more groups. In recent years, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these might be viewed as the traditional DTOs. However, many analysts suggest that those 7 seem to have now fragmented to 9 or as many as 20 major organizations. Several analysts estimate there have been at least 80,000 homicides linked to organized crime since 2006. Few dispute that the annual tally of organized crime-related homicides in Mexico has declined since 2011, although there is disagreement about the rate of decline. It appears that the steep increase in organized crime-related homicides during the six-year administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) is likely to trend down far more slowly than it rose. The Mexican government no longer publishes data on organized crime-related homicides. However, the government reported the rate of all homicides in Mexico has declined by 30% since 2012 (roughly 15% in 2013, and another 15% in 2014). Although murder rates have diminished, the incidence of other violent crimes targeting Mexican citizens, such as kidnapping and extortion, has increased through 2013 and stayed elevated. Notably, questions about the accuracy of the government's crime statistics persist. Former President Calderon made his aggressive campaign against the DTOs a defining policy of his government, which the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change that led to significantly greater instability among the groups and continued violence. Since his inauguration in December 2012, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs have fragmented, and new crime groups have emerged. Meanwhile, the DTOs and other criminal gangs furthered their expansion into other illegal activities, such as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft, and the organizations now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to governance in Mexico no less threatening to the rule of law than the challenge that faced Pena Nieto's predecessor. According to the Pena Nieto Administration, 93 of the 122 top criminal targets that their government has identified have been arrested or otherwise "neutralized" (killed in arrest efforts) as of May 2015, although Guzman's escape confounds that achievement. Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution through alliances with U.S. gangs. This report provides background on drug trafficking and organized crime inside Mexico: it identifies the major DTOs, and it examines how the organized crime "landscape" has been significantly altered by fragmentation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed July 28, 2015 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 136160 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: Otis, John Title: The FARC and Colombia's Illegal Drug Trade Summary: In 2014, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Latin America's oldest and largest guerrilla army known as the FARC, marked the 50th anniversary of the start of its war against the Colombian government. More than 220,000 people have been killed and more than five million people uprooted from their homes in the conflict, which is the last remaining guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere. However, this grim, half-century milestone coincides with peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC that began in Havana, Cuba, in November 2012. The Havana talks have advanced much farther than the three previous efforts to negotiate with the FARC and there is a growing sense that a final peace treaty is now likely. So far, the two sides have reached agreements on three of the five points on the negotiating agenda, including an accord to resolve an issue that helps explain why the conflict has lasted so long: The FARC's deep involvement in the taxation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs. On May 16, 2014, the government and the FARC signed an agreement stating that under the terms of a final peace treaty, the two sides would work in tandem to eradicate coca, the plant used to make cocaine, and to combat cocaine trafficking in areas under guerrilla control. A decade ago, Colombia supplied about 90 percent of the world's cocaine. But due to anti-drug efforts in Colombia as well as Peru's reemergence as a major producer, Colombia since 2011 is believed to provide less than half of the world's cocaine, according to U.S. officials. Yet drug profits continue to be a vital source of cash for the FARC, a smaller Marxist rebel group known as the National Liberation Army, or ELN, and other criminal organizations in Colombia. Massive drug profits help the FARC to buy weapons, uniforms, and supplies and to recruit fresh troops. The fight between the FARC and illegal right-wing paramilitary groups over coca fields and drug smuggling corridors has been a key factor in the conflict's extreme levels of violence, forced displacement and land grabs. When the two sides first met to discuss the drug issue in November 2013, Colombia's chief peace negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, called the illegal drug trade "the fuel that feeds the conflict." During the last round of peace talks with the government that lasted from 1999 to 2002, the FARC was at the peak of its military power thanks, in part, to a surge in drug income and made almost no effort to seriously negotiate a peace treaty. Since then, the U.S. government has provided Colombia with $9.3 billion in aid, much of which has been spent on counterinsurgency and counterdrug programs targeting the FARC. The Colombian military's successful efforts to weaken the FARC and reduce its drug income through targeting coca fields, drug laboratories, and smugglers have helped convince FARC leaders to return to the bargaining table for negotiations that hold much promise for a final peace accord. This paper will examine the FARC's long history of involvement in Colombia's illegal narcotics industry and the impact of rebel drug profits on the course of the armed conflict. It will also explore the likely impact of the drug accord reached at the peace negotiations in Cuba on efforts to extricate the FARC from the drug-trafficking equation, possible changes in Colombia's counterdrug policies, as well as the strong possibility that some FARC members will continue producing and smuggling drugs in a post-conflict scenario. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf Shelf Number: 136289 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceRevolutionary Armed Forced of ColombiaSmuggling |
Author: Haahr, Kathryn Title: Addressing the Concerns of the Oil Industry: Security Challenges in Northeastern Mexico and Government Responses Summary: This case study analyzes the Mexican Government's response to recent threats to and attacks against energy infrastructure and personnel in Tamaulipas and Veracruz. The government is addressing the issue of cartel-induced violence in Tamaulipas and Veracruz by mobilizing security frameworks for newly established and existing state law enforcement entities and the Military. The security arrangements, that include policing of major ports and protecting Pemex facilities and operations, should help the oil and gas industry to better absorb the financial risks to its business operations. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 4, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Addressing%20the%20Concerns%20of%20the%20Oil%20Industry_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Addressing%20the%20Concerns%20of%20the%20Oil%20Industry_0.pdf Shelf Number: 136309 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug-Related ViolenceInfrastructure SecurityOil IndustryOrganized CrimeTerrorism |
Author: Negroponte, Diana Villiers Title: Pillar IV of Beyond Merida: Addressing the Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Related Crime and Violence in Mexico Summary: The 'Merida Initiative' and its successor 'Beyond Merida' form an integral part of the Mexican National Crime Strategy that seeks to contain, if not defeat narcotics trafficking, organized crime and the consequential violence. Elaborated in October 2009, both governments announced the second phase in early 2010. Broader than the 'Merida Initiative,' 'Beyond Merida' proposes four categories, known as 'Pillars,' some of which directly involve the U.S. government agencies and others which imply collaboration. - Pillar I. Disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations . - Pillar II. Strengthen state institutions, i.e. law enforcement, the judiciary and correctional institutions to reduce public insecurity and provide better serve Mexican citizens. - Pillar III. Develop a "smart border" with the U.S. so as to facilitate trade and overcome the bottlenecks currently choking the U.S./Mexico border. - Pillar IV. Address the social and economic factors contributing to the violence and seek to build strong and resilient communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence. This article examines U.S. and Mexican government efforts to develop Pillar IV. It also recognizes programs that Mexico commenced in 2010 to focus seriously on the socio-economic causes of violence in the northern cities, Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey. This article addresses the effectiveness of current bilateral programs and asks what changes might be made to increase the impact in the short and long term. Details: Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Accessed August 4, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Merida%20-%20Pillar%20IV%20Working%20Paper%20Format1_1.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Merida%20-%20Pillar%20IV%20Working%20Paper%20Format1_1.pdf Shelf Number: 136310 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeMerida InitiativeSocioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Consolidating "Consolidation": Columbia's "security and development" zones await a civilian handoff, while Washington backs away from the concept Summary: Colombia's government is negotiating peace with the country's largest and oldest guerrilla group, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). If the talks succeed- a strong possibility - Colombia faces a big question: what will be different in the vast territories where the guerrillas have been in control, or operated freely, for decades? In these areas, violence, drug trafficking, and warlordism have long been the norm, and the government's presence has been virtually nonexistent. If the government does not establish itself in these jungles, mountains, plains, coasts, and borderlands, the FARC's negotiated end will make little difference; illegality and violence will continue to fill the vacuum. Colombia must follow a successful negotiation with getting the government into the country's ungoverned zones. And not just military occupiers: a real, civilian state whose members provide basic services, operate without impunity, and thus enjoy the population's support. Will Colombia be able to fill the vacuum and end the cycle of violence? As WOLA's new report Consolidating "Consolidation" describes, the record of the National Territorial Consolidation Plan - a five-year-old program with that very goal - should worry us that it might not. Backed by at least half a billion dollars in U.S. assistance, this ambitious program seeks to bring the government into several areas of the country with histories of illegal armed groups, violence, drug trafficking, and statelessness. (It is often called the "La Macarena" program, after the southern Colombian zone where the most advanced pilot project has taken place.) Today, while "Consolidation" has brought security improvements and more soldiers and police to a few territories, the governance vacuum remains far from filled. In the Consolidation zones, armed groups remain very active, especially outside of town centers. Soldiers are by far the most commonly seen government representatives, and the civilian parts of the government - such as health services, education, agriculture, road-builders, land-titlers, judges, and prosecutors - are lagging very far behind. In Consolidating "Consolidation," WOLA sought to identify the reasons why the Consolidation program's military-to-civilian transfer has stalled. Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy Adam Isacson found that while the U.S. and Colombian governments underestimated the difficulty of achieving security and the cost of "state-building," much of the blame lies with civilian government agencies themselves, most of which have been very reluctant to set up a presence in Consolidation zones. But we found something even more serious: the entire Consolidation model is losing momentum quickly and may have begun to deteriorate. Based on dozens of interviews and a very close read of available evidence, Consolidating "Consolidation" portrays a program lacking interest and backing at high levels of government. What was once a showcase program stagnated during a year and a half-long "rethinking," followed by several months of infighting that culminated in the sudden exit of the program's director. Meanwhile, in places like Afghanistan, the United States is edging away from similar missions, which it calls "Stability Operations," that sought to provide basic services to citizens in ungoverned areas. Instead, U.S. forces are relying more on Special Forces operations and drone strikes. Programs continue in Consolidation zones in Colombia, thanks in great part to US$227 million in USAID contracts awarded since 2010. But Consolidation, which once promised to bring a functioning government to areas that never had one, may be on its way to becoming a politically driven handout program attached to an open-ended military occupation. If Consolidation fades away, the report warns, it is not clear what will replace it in Colombia's neglected territories. As Colombia faces the possibility of peace in zones of historic guerrilla control, it is crucial that a plan be in place to prevent a re-emergence of violence. If the peace talks succeed, for a brief period Colombia will have a window of opportunity to bring the government to areas that have long generated violence, bringing their citizens into national civic and economic life for the first time. The National Territorial Consolidation Plan could offer a way to do this, but only if it returns to its initial vision of a phased, coordinated entry of civilian government. If this scheme, or something like it, is to succeed, it will require political will from the highest levels to ensure that the civilians take over as quickly as security conditions allow. And it will require a renewed - but far more civilian-centered - commitment from the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 17, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf Shelf Number: 136802 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceViolenceWarlords |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: New humanitarian frontiers: Addressing criminal violence in Mexico and Central America Summary: Parts of Central America and Mexico are suffering a humanitarian crisis which stems directly from expanding criminal violence. In vulnerable communities in the region there are mass casualties on a par with conflicts elsewhere in the world - rape, kidnapping, human trafficking, extortion, forced displacement (both internally and across borders), migration of unaccompanied minors from crime-ravaged communities and exploitation and murder. The report pinpoints three structural challenges to a stronger humanitarian agenda in response to criminal violence in the region: the features and characteristics of criminal violence, the presence of self-sustaining regional mixed migration and the flow of narcotics and the extremely fragile nature of Central American states. The case for a reinvigorated humanitarian approach to criminal violence is stronger than ever. There are notable opportunities. This report argues that the existing strengths of humanitarian organisations in addressing criminal violence could be responsibly enhanced. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 27, 2015 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/201510-am-central-americas-violence-en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/201510-am-central-americas-violence-en.pdf Shelf Number: 137158 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceExtortionHomicidesHuman TraffickingKidnappingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Paredes, Dusan Title: Is crime in Mexico a disamenity? Evidence from hedonic valuation approach Summary: Since Roback (1982)'s seminal work, the literature has evaluated the role of the amenities to equilibrate the regional differentials of nominal wages and prices. While these studies generally find evidence for traditional amenities and disamenities in developed countries, it still exists a scarce exploration on how those characteristics assessed, like violence, affect the equilibrium in less developed countries. In this paper, we explore violence as amenity or disamenity for the case of Mexico as a particular and unique natural experiment. We use the hedonic wage and rent theory proposed by Roback using data from the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure Survey, along with other information at municipal and state level. For our particular hypothesis, we find evidence to support that inhabitants in traditional drug trafficking states could consider drug-related crime as an amenity. Details: Antofagasta, Chile: Departamento de Economia, Universidad Catolica del Norte, 2015. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: No 67, Documentos de Trabajo en Economia y Ciencia Regional : Accessed October 30, 2015 at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/cat/dtecon/dt201512.html Year: 2015 Country: Mexico URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/cat/dtecon/dt201512.html Shelf Number: 137178 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomics and CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Mejia, Daniel Title: Bushes and Bullets: Illegal Cocaine Markets and Violence in Colombia Summary: This paper proposes a new identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of illicit drug markets on violence using a panel of Colombian municipalities covering the period 1994-2008. Using a UNODC survey of Colombian rural households involved in coca cultivation, we estimate the determinants of land suitability for coca cultivation. With these results we create a suitability index that depends on the altitude, erosion, soil aptitude, and precipitation of a municipality. Our exogenous suitability index predicts the presence of coca crops cross sectionally and its expansion between 1994-2000. We show that following an increase in the demand for Colombian cocaine, coca cultivation increases disproportionately in municipalities with a high suitability index. This provides an exogenous source of variation in the extent of coca cultivation within municipalities that we use as an instrument to uncover the causal effect of illegal cocaine markets on violence. We find that a 10% increase in the value of coca cultivation in a municipality increases homicides by about 1.25%, forced displacement by about 3%, attacks by insurgent groups by about 2%, and incidents involving the explosion of land mines by about 1%. Our evidence is consistent with the view suggesting that prohibition creates rents for suppliers in illegal markets, and these rents cause violence as different armed groups fight each other, the government and the civil population for their control and extraction. Details: Bogota: Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics, 2013. Source: Internet Resource: Documento CEDE No. 2013-53 : Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353979 Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353979 Shelf Number: 137222 Keywords: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Drug-Related ViolenceIllegal Markets |
Author: Ajzenman, Nicolas Title: On the Distributed Costs of Drug-Related Homicides Summary: Reliable estimates of the effects of violence on economic outcomes are scarce. We exploit the many-fold increase in homicides in 2008-2011 in Mexico resulting from its war on organized drug traffickers to estimate the effect of drug-related homicides on house prices. We use an unusually rich dataset that provides national coverage on house prices and homicides and exploit within-municipality variations. We find that the impact of violence on housing prices is borne entirely by the poor sectors of the population. An increase in homicides equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 3% decrease in the price of low-income housing. In spite of this large burden on the poor, the willingness to pay in order to reverse the increase in drug-related crime is not high. We estimate it to be approximately 0.1% of Mexico's GDP. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 364: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/distributive-costs-drug-related-homicides_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/distributive-costs-drug-related-homicides_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132248 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeEconomics of CrimeHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: International Displacement Monitoring Centre Title: Forced displacement linked to transnational organised crime in Mexico Summary: Drug cartel violence in Mexico has increased dramatically since 2007, when the new government of President Felipe Calderon identified insecurity as a key problem and began deploying the military to fight the cartels in key locations. According to various analysts the strategy has backfired, stirring up a hornet's nest by disturbing existing arrangements between the cartels, and sparking wars both within and between them. The impact of the violence has been enormous. Government figures put the number of people killed since the launch of the security strategy at 47,000, with more than 15,000 losing their lives in 2010 and 12,900 in the first nine months of 2011. The media have repeatedly put the death toll at 50,000, and many have referred to the violence as an insurgency or armed conflict. It is clear, however, that the cartels do not have a political agenda or ideology, and such references have prompted angry responses from the Mexican government. Whether the violence can be defined as an internal armed conflict under international humanitarian law or not, its effects on the civilian population have been significant and the response inadequate. One impact has been forced migration, both internal and cross-border. Because of available resources and timeframe this study focuses exclusively on the former. Civil society organisations, academic institutions and the media have increasingly documented cases and patterns of forced internal displacement caused by drug cartel violence. That said, aside from two cases of mass displacement - in Tamaulipas in 2010 and in Michoacan in 2011 - most people have fled individually, and as a result information is scattered. This study aims to fill that information gap. Firstly, it documents an empirical link between drug cartel violence and forced displacement at the national level, distinguishing it from economic migration and where possible identifying patterns of displacement. Secondly, it identifies and describes the vulnerabilities of those affected, focusing on access to the basic necessities of life and livelihood opportunities in places of displacement, and housing, land and property rights. Thirdly, it maps government responses at both the federal and state level. Details: Geneva, SWIT: IDMC, 2012. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2012/2012005-am-mexico-Mexico-forced-displacement-en.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2012/2012005-am-mexico-Mexico-forced-displacement-en.pdf Shelf Number: 137705 Keywords: DisappearancesDrug CartelsDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceForced MigrationHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: The Devil is in the Details: Nangarhar's continued decline into insurgency, violence and widespread drug production Summary: Nangarhar - a province that historically has been one of the major entry points for the capture of Kabul - is in complete disarray. It lies in chaos, riven by a process of political fragmentation that has increased in both pace and severity since the presidential elections and the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG). In fact, there seems little to currently bind the province together given the faltering economy, a reduction in aid flows and the continued disassembling of the political alliances that maintained stability during the early years of Gul Aga Sherzai's governorship. Further catalysing this are the drawdown and subsequent closure of the US-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) - an institution that was, for a period of time, a guarantor for the Afghan state in the province. Indeed, without US military support, and with little direction from Kabul, the Afghan National Defence Security Forces (ANDSF) appear reluctant to leave the sanctuary of their fortified bases. This has led to further losses in government-held territory, particularly in the districts south of the main highway, which runs east to west linking Kabul to the Pakistan border at Torkham. Details: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Brief: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1602E%20The%20Devil%20is%20in%20the%20Details%20Nangarhar%20continued%20decline%20into%20insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1602E%20The%20Devil%20is%20in%20the%20Details%20Nangarhar%20continued%20decline%20into%20insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 137856 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceIllegal DrugsNarcotics Natural Resources OpiumPoppy Cultivation |
Author: O'Neil, Shannon K. Title: Mexico on the Brink Summary: The headlines don't mislead. Mexican society is reeling from the collateral damage of the permanent war on drugs in the Americas, as crime cartels duke it out for control of illicit exports to the US. Indeed, high levels of violence largely explain why Mexico ranked 104th out of 142 countries in the Safety and Security category in the 2013 Legatum Prosperity Index - and why, in spite of a very high ranking (27th) in the Economy category, the country is only 59th in the overall prosperity ranking. But that's just one element of the story of contemporary Mexico. Here, Shannon O'Neil, a senior fellow for Latin American Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (and author of the new book, Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead), focuses on Mexico's progress in escaping what development economists call the "middle-income trap". In the early 1980s, Mexico began to shake off the political and economic torpor created by one-party, Tammany Hallstyle rule and self-imposed isolation from the competitive pressures of a rapidly integrating global economy. Reform was initially forced on the country as a condition for relief from the consequences of default on its foreign loans. But it triggered a series of secondary tremors that shook the domestic economic and political landscape, leading first to the free trade agreement with the US and Canada, and then to the opening of the political system to interests that had no stake in preserving a bloated, bureaucratic government and corrupt, state-owned enterprises. O'Neil picks up the story from there. Arguably the least understood aspect of Mexico's coming of age, she suggests, is the role played by global supply chains in manufacturing. Mexico's combination of competitively priced labour, proximity to the US and Canada, and market-friendly regulation has led to an unprecedented degree of integration between the three economies, powering the growth of Mexico's middle-class. O'Neil makes it clear that the path forward is not strewn with roses, however. Organised crime still makes life terrifying for millions on a daily basis. Public services - in particular, public education - remain inadequate to meet the challenge of creating a workforce the equal of, say, the US or Northern Europe. The national oil monopoly is still corrupt, poorly managed and woefully lacking in modern technology. But by O'Neil's reading, Mexico really does have a shot at joining the elite club of rich, democratic nations. Details: London: Legatum Institute, 2013. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Prosperity in Depth: Mexico: Accessed May 13, 2016 at: https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/country-growth-reports/pid-mexico-2013---mexico-on-the-brink.pdf?sfvrsn=0 Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/country-growth-reports/pid-mexico-2013---mexico-on-the-brink.pdf?sfvrsn=0 Shelf Number: 139017 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeHomicidesOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Nussio, Enzo Title: Peace and Violence in Colombia Summary: The Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos is currently in talks with the oldest of Latin America's guerilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); most recently, it has also engaged with the smaller Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN). In particular, it appears possible that a peace agreement will soon be signed with FARC. President Santos is promoting the negotiations in Havana internationally as good news in a crisis-ridden world. However, the general population of Colombia remains skeptical. In a survey of March 2016, about two thirds of respondents were pessimistic about the negotiations; nearly half would prefer an end of negotiations and a military offensive against FARC. Many Colombians have no faith in a treaty with the rebels, whom they regard as untrustworthy, and believe that the violence plaguing Colombia cannot be eliminated at the negotiation table. "Peace" is generally regarded as an unrealistic, utopian goal, even if the FARC and ELN fighters should lay down their arms. Despite the hopeful prospects, it is likely that the pessimism of the general population will prove correct: An end of political violence would by no means lead to the end of societal and criminal violence in the country. Details: Zurich, SWIT: Center for Security Studies (CSS), 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-191-EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-191-EN.pdf Shelf Number: 139050 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug-Related ViolenceFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)Guerilla GroupsPolitical ViolenceViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Gaudig-Rueger, Steffen Title: Street Gangs, Outlaw Bikers, the Mafia and the Mexican Cartels: Dynamics of Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Canada Summary: Over the last few years, Mexican organizations active in the cocaine trade have chosen to stop working through Canadian middlemen and have instead established a direct presence in Canada. What factors have facilitated this decision? How is it likely to affect the dynamics of the transnational drug trade in Canada? It appears that the decision to stop working through middlemen can be traced back to a relative contemporary weakness of Canadian organized crime groups that traditionally handled the Canadian distribution. Further, a convenient network opportunity for direct expansion into Canada has presented itself to the cartels in the form of recently immigrated Mexican-Canadian Mennonites, some of whom have long acted as Mexican cartel-agents. Despite the fearsome reputation of Mexican cartels, there has been no noticeable increase in drug-related violence in Canada, and it is highly unlikely that they will bring Mexico-style violence to Canada with them in the near-term. Details: Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary, 2015. 109p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 31, 2016 at: http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2511/4/ucalgary_2015_gaudig_steffen.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: http://theses.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/11023/2511/4/ucalgary_2015_gaudig_steffen.pdf Shelf Number: 139251 Keywords: Bikers Drug Trafficking Drug-Related ViolenceMexican Cartels Organized Crime Outlaw Bikers Street Gangs |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: World Drug Report 2016 Summary: The World Drug Report 2016 comes at a decisive moment, just months after Member States, at a special session of the General Assembly, adopted a comprehensive set of operational recommendations on the world drug problem. The session was only the third in the history of the General Assembly to focus on drugs, and the resulting outcome document, entitled "Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem", provides a concrete way forward to take action on shared challenges. In the outcome document, Member States reaffirmed their commitment to addressing persistent, new and evolving challenges in line with the three international drug control conventions, which were recognized as allowing States parties sufficient flexibility to design and implement national drug policies consistent with the principle of common and shared responsibility. The operational recommendations contained in the outcome document encompass measures to address demand and supply reduction, as well as to improve access to controlled medicines while preventing their diversion; they cover human rights, youth, children, women and communities and highlight emerging challenges and the need to promote long-term, comprehensive, sustainable, development-oriented and balanced drug control policies and programmes that include alternative development. The text highlights the importance of drug abuse prevention and treatment; encourages the development, adoption and implementation of alternative or additional measures with regard to conviction or punishment; and promotes proportionate national sentencing policies, practices and guidelines for drug-related offences. Now the international community must come together to make good on its commitments. The World Drug Report 2016, which provides a comprehensive overview of major developments in drug markets, trafficking routes and the health impact of drug use, supports comprehensive, balanced and integrated rights-based approaches. This year's report offers insight into the wide-ranging impact of drugs not only on the health and well-being of individuals, but also on the people around them - families and communities. This can include such harms as HIV, as well as the threat of violence, faced in particular by women and children. Details: New York: UNODC, 2016. 174p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2016 at: https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf Shelf Number: 139529 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug Abuse PreventionDrug ReformDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and Crime |
Author: Turhal, Tugrul Title: Organizational Structure of PKK and Non-PKK-Linked Turkish Drug Trafficking Organizations: The Influence of Social bonds Summary: Drugs and drug related crime problems pose major threats to societies around the world in terms of their negative consequences at both individual and societal levels. Turkish drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) have ethnic, social, geographic, and economic ties with Turkey's eastern neighbors, the Balkan Region, and Europe, and are considered to play major roles in the drug trade. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has also had a longstanding presence in the drug trade in this region. The goals of this research are (1) to identify the social and demographic characteristics of people in drug-trafficking organizations in Turkey; (2) to elucidate the differences, if any, of the social and structural characteristics in PKK-related and non-PKK-related drug organizations; and (3) to analyze the impact of social bonds on the Turkish drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), their networks and relationships. The data used in this study are official Turkish Police records of drug trafficking cases between 1984 and 2010. Several statistical techniques were used to analyze the data; relationship analysis, analysis of difference, and social network analysis to address the research questions. An analysis of these relationships at both the individual and network level was conducted using original data on 773 members from 100 drug-trafficking organizations (50 of them PKK linked and 50 of them non-PKK linked). The results indicate that while there are some similarities with PKK and non-PKK linked organizations there are also distinct differences in their individual and organizational characteristics, structure, role distribution, nationality, and social ties and bonds. In addition, the study found important evidence connecting the terrorist organization (PKK) with several non-PKK organizations. These connections are quite strong for a portion of the networks. This study significantly contributes to the related literature; it provides a general overview of drug and drug related crime problems and their connection to terrorist organizations throughout the world particularly for those located in Turkey and the Middle Eastern regions. Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2015. 258p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/10137/Turhal_gmu_0883E_11045.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: Turkey URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/10137/Turhal_gmu_0883E_11045.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 139834 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceSocial BondsTerrorism |
Author: Richardson, Lydia Title: Armed violence and poverty in Brazil: A case study of Rio de Janeiro and assessment of Viva Rio for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative Summary: This report is the result of an 11-day visit to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in September 2004. Wider research and information were used to complement the stakeholder interviews held during this period. The objectives of the study were to: - Contribute to the UK Government Department for International Development- (DFID) funded Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) global research study on the links between armed violence and poverty. - Contribute to the AVPI global study on assessing and reviewing the impact of small arms and light weapons (SALW) projects on small arms availability/misuse and poverty. - Support the case study organisation (Viva Rio) with its internal reflection on strategy and impact. Causes of violence in Rio de Janeiro are multi-faceted. High levels of inequality and physical, social and economic exclusion from the formal system are some of the principle causes. This combines with cultural factors such as machismo and the draw of perceived higher social status and identity through joining gangs. The availability of guns, cocaine and the marijuana industry exacerbates the problem. The lack of an integrated public security strategy coupled with a violent and corrupt police, and a judiciary and prison system which is ineffective, are also contributing factors. The political and economic history of Brazil has played a part: the transition from dictatorship to democracy; rapid and unplanned urbanization; and shifts in labour market requirements to higher skill levels to meet new demands, resulting in high unemployment and frustration felt by those with some education but insufficient to secure a job in the formal economy. Perpetrators and victims of armed violence in Rio de Janeiro are primarily the police, drug traffickers (mainly young men of 14-29 years old), and civilians caught in the crossfire. Favelas are the main locations of gun violence but criminal violence does occur in other parts of the city. The principle type of armed violence is organised drug gang fighting for territorial control; police use of arms; armed robbery and petty crime. Details: Bradford, UK: University of Bradford, Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2005. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2016 at: http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:8080/bitstream/handle/10454/1000/AVPI_Rio_de_Janeiro.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2005 Country: Brazil URL: http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:8080/bitstream/handle/10454/1000/AVPI_Rio_de_Janeiro.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 140028 Keywords: Armed ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceFavelasGun-Related ViolenceJuvenile GangsPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Hume, Mo Title: Armed violence and poverty in El Salvador: A mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative Summary: One of the most powerful conflicts to affect Central America in the 1980s was that in El Salvador (1980-1992), resulting in the death of more than 80,000 citizens. This report on El Salvador is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies can be found at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon secondary data sources including existing research studies, reports and evaluations commissioned by operational agencies, and early warning and survey data where this has been available. These secondary sources have been complemented by interviews with government officers, aid policymakers and practitioners, researchers and members of the local population. The analysis and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or policy of DFID or the UK government Details: Bradford, UK: University of Bradford, Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2004. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2016 at: https://core.ac.uk/download/files/10/6001.pdf Year: 2004 Country: El Salvador URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/files/10/6001.pdf Shelf Number: 140019 Keywords: Armed ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceFavelasGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesJuvenile GangsPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Turner, Mandy Title: The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development. Full Report of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative Summary: This study examines the extent to which armed violence and small arms and light weapons (SALW) possession and usage, impoverishes individuals, groups, societies and states in various armed violence situations. The objective of the study is not only to advance and clarify understandings and knowledge in this area, which has been largely neglected in policy and research, but also to inform programme design and evaluation. In addition, it offers suggestions on how donors and agencies working in the field of armed violence/SALW and development can work better together to alleviate poverty. Details: Bradford, UK: University of Bradford, Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2005. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2016 at: https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10454/1006/AVPI_Synthesis_Report.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2005 Country: International URL: https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10454/1006/AVPI_Synthesis_Report.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 140020 Keywords: Armed ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceJuvenile GangsPovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Kruijt, Dirk Title: Drugs, Democracy and Security: The impact of organized crime on the political system of Latin America Summary: This study is a comparative analysis about the impacts of organized crime - and specifically drugs related crime - on the Latin American and Caribbean political systems. According to the terms of reference, the focus of the study is on Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Bolivia. A first draft of this paper was presented at a conference organized by New York University (NYU), International IDEA, the Open Society Institute (OSI) and NIMD and held in Lima from 8 to 11 February 2011. While travelling and collecting data I added information about additional countries in order to facilitate a more general overview of the problem. During previous missions in 2010 I had also accumulated information about organized crime and drugs in Central America and the Andean countries. The result is that in this study comparative data are presented about the three major Andean coca-producing countries and the most affected Meso-American transition countries (namely, Mexico and the northern triangle of Central America). The seven countries analysed in this study have different profiles with respect to their internal stability; the level of crime related violence; the strength of political institutions, security apparatus and the judiciary; and the national policies with respect to coca cultivation, cocaine production and crime prevention. The effects on the political system, key institutions and political parties also differ by country. Colombia and Mexico are heavily affected by crime-related violence. One characteristic of these two countries is the fact that coca cultivation and cocaine production are strictly illegal and penalised. The prevailing strategy in both countries is a militarised countering strategy, with strong financial and intelligence support from the United States' government agencies. By contrast, Peru and Bolivia are substantially more tolerant with respect to the cocaleros, the generally poor peasants who cultivate coca. These two countries are less affected by crime-related violence. While the level of violence directly associated with coca cultivation and cocaine production is extremely high in Colombia, it is remarkably moderate in Peru, and considerably low in Bolivia. Contrary to the opinion of some participants in the debate about organized crime and the state, there are no failed states in Latin America, though areas exist where effective state control is not in place. Even in Colombia and Mexico the core regions and cities are relatively unaffected by the drug wars and the associated violence. In Central America, and in particular Guatemala, the security forces are on the defensive. In all countries the police are the weakest link in the cluster of institutions involved in countering strategies. In all countries the armed forces appear to be less infiltrated by crime. With the exception of Honduras, the armed forces in Latin American or Caribbean countries do not act as political players with ambitions of participating in the political arena. In Guatemala, the national government decided in the mid-2000s that its security institutions and judicial system were so frail and vulnerable that the country was in need of an international commission, the Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) to supervise the functioning of these vital institutions. No other government has felt the need to request this sort of international assistance or supervision. I also maintain that theses about 'state capture' by organized crime are not based on strong empirical studies. In this study I make a comparison with the former guerrilla organizations and the counterinsurgency strategies that prevailed in Latin America between the 1960s and the late 1980s. Present countering strategies in the region have some resemblance to the more or less classical counterinsurgency strategy and tactics used during the anti-guerrilla campaigns, which were then generally designed and procured by military dictatorships. There are, of course, also fundamental differences: previously, guerrilla movements were 'politico-military' organizations whose ideologies were explicitly aimed at overthrowing dictatorships and establishing more democratic and socialist governments. The criminal organizations of the present day are 'economic-military' rather than 'politico-military' organizations, aiming not for the overthrow of the state but for an uninterrupted and easily obtained economic surplus. This is to be achieved through violence and corruption - either via the easy way (by corrupting authorities) or the hard way (by guns and gangs). Their strategy is to control territories or commercial corridors which act as leeways for production and trafficking and which guarantee uninterrupted profits. Their final objective is surplus, a 'good life' and their incorporation within elite segments of society and politics. Defining 'state capture' as a final objective tends to obscure the perverse effects of organized crime, including long-term corruption of key institutions of law and order and a semi-permanent state of impunity and immunity with respect to law enforcement. More specifically, we can identify four main effects: 1 Impunity has as a long-lasting effect in the form of the de-legitimisation of national security and the judicial and penitentiary system, an avalanche process in which political parties and social movements are also affected. 2 A second perverse effect is the phenomenon of the widespread infiltration, at the local and regional level, of political parties and political representatives. In Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and other countries the corruption and intimidation of 'tame' politicians has been ironically dubbed the system of 'para-politica' or 'para-politicos'. 3 A third perverse effect is the deteriorating reputation of local politicians. Populist presidents, from Menem in Argentina to Fujimori in Peru, have used the stereotype of easy-to-corrupt magistrates and politicians to launch themselves as the 'true defenders of the poor' against parliament and the courts. 4 A fourth perverse effect is the confusion between hard-core crime organizations, operating with military-like enforcers or paramilitary organizations, and the 'normal' but much more visible groupings of criminal youth gangs or maras in Central America and several metropolitan areas in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Central America this has resulted in mano dura (zero tolerance) presidential campaigns, aimed not at a solution to organized crime but at the elimination or imprisonment of the highly visible (and tattooed) mara members. It is my conviction that political parties in particular need to be responsible for adequate security agendas. However, in most Latin American and Caribbean countries, politicians are inclined to delegate this all-important agenda to 'experts': that is, former generals and commanders of specialised police task forces. One recommendation I would therefore make is that donor organizations such as NIMD should provide policy research and assist in the design of integral security agendas and related policies, making them accessible to political parties and civil society in general. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2011. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://nimd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Drugs_democracy_and_security_english_-_nimd_june_2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: http://nimd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Drugs_democracy_and_security_english_-_nimd_june_2011.pdf Shelf Number: 140490 Keywords: CocaineDrug-related ViolenceOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Clark, Kyleigh M. Title: When Prohibition and Violence Collide: The Case of Mexico Summary: Some theorists have found a positive correlation between increased drug prohibition enforcement and a rise in violence. These studies focus on the United States and Colombia, arguing that prohibition amplifies violence, rather than decreasing it. Much like the United States and Colombia earlier in their histories, Mexico has recently experienced an escalation in violence. Since beginning a democratic transition in 2000, the Mexican government has intensified a war on drugs by strengthening the rule of law, battling corruption, and cooperating with the United States' drug war. This study, using a congruence method with process-tracing, will analyze the Mexican case in depth, with the goal of determining whether increased drug prohibition enforcement has escalated drug-related violence in Mexico, and what effect the violence has on the legitimacy of democracy itself in Mexico Details: Dayton, OH: Wright State University, 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2209&context=etd_all Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2209&context=etd_all Shelf Number: 146034 Keywords: Drug Control PolicyDrug EnforcementDrug ProhibitionDrug-Related ViolenceWar on Drugs |
Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda. 5th International Report Summary: The fifth edition of the International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety develops, from the urban perspective, various topics relevant to the current context in cities. As with previous editions of the Report, the first chapter is a constant of ICPC's International Reports, reviewing major trends in crime and in its prevention. The following two chapters address the relationship between the urban setting and the prevention of crime through two distinct lenses: the first gives a general overview of the issues and major trends facing cities; the second, in contrast, offers a comparative perspective, particularly in relation to national-local relationships in the Latin American context. The final three chapters address three fundamental topics on the prevention of urban crime: public transport, the prevention of drug-related crime, and the prevention of violent radicalization. Details: Ottawa: ICPC, 2016. 204p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 145994 Keywords: Crime PreventionDrug-Related ViolenceExtremist GroupsPublic TransportRadical GroupsRadicalizationUrban Areas and Crime |
Author: Tamayo, Adrian Title: Determining Statistical Pattern on the Drug-Related Killing in Philippines Using ARIMA and Poisson Techniques Summary: A univariate time series technique was conducted to determine statistical pattern on killings of drug suspects in Philippines from May 19 to July 7, 2016. The technique reveal a moving average of order 2, MA(2) with a positive coefficient suggestive that value of outcome variable x tend to increase, on the average, than the recent value of x . This means that drug-related killings will tend to be higher than the most current rate; and killings is seen to increase as weekend comes. Poisson regression indicated an average of 13 deaths on a Sunday; only 2 on Monday average; odds of survival increases as well as weekend comes. Finally, the forecast model and the simulation are limited by the data used. Structure of the univariate series may change as additional data are added; this is also true for the forecasted average occurrence. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 71528: Accessed November 21, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72518/1/MPRA_paper_72518.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Philippines URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72518/1/MPRA_paper_72518.pdf Shelf Number: 147848 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesViolent Crime |
Author: Munoz-Herrera, Manual Title: Drug Dealing In Bucaramanga: Case Study In A Drug Producing Country Summary: We present a case study of the market of drug dealing in the context of a drug producing country. A main characteristic of a drug producing country is that illegal drugs are more accessible and have dramatically lower prices in the street market compared to countries that do not produce drugs. We locate our study to the city of Bucaramanga, Colombia; the country with the largest production of cocaine in the world. We make use of two sources of primary information (i) direct interviews to drug dealers, and (ii) media analysis of the local newspaper. Our main finding is that individual dealers exchange drugs, without any incentives to integrate and take control of the distribution in the city. That is, the low prices of drugs reduce profit and deter dealers to fight for monopoly, leading to a decentralized market of multiple uni-personal firms who use no violence. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2014. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 58523: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58523/1/MPRA_paper_58523.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58523/1/MPRA_paper_58523.pdf Shelf Number: 147951 Keywords: CocaineDrug DealersDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related Violence |
Author: Nowak, Matthias Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Honduras Summary: With 64 violent deaths per 100,000 people in 2015, Honduras is among the most violent countries in the world (Widmer and Pavesi, 2016a; 2016b). In the last five years, 81 per cent of homicides were committed with small arms, often in the gang and drug-related violence plaguing the country. With the costs of firearm-related deaths and injuries estimated at more than 3 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product in 2013 (Flores, 2016, p. 6), addressing illicit small arms flows is critical to improving Honduras's security and development prospects. In recent years, illicit arms flows have gained significant attention at the global level, culminating in September 2015 with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, more specifically, SDG Target 16.4, which commits states to 'significantly reduce illicit . . . arms flows' by 2030 (UNGA, 2015). As the Survey has pointed out, the UN’s proposed indicator for measuring progress towards achieving this target—Indicator 16.4.21 —can be complemented with a range of additional indicators (De Martino and Atwood, 2015). This Research Note —the second in a series of four on measuring illicit arms flows in selected countries—examines the challenges of monitoring illicit small arms flows in Honduras. After reviewing the main known sources of illicit arms in the country, it discusses three indicators that are relevant to illicit arms flows: firearms seizures, small arms prices on illicit markets, and firearms homicides. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Notes. no. 62: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-62.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Honduras URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-62.pdf Shelf Number: 140469 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceGun-Related Violence Homicides Illicit Arms Illicit Weapons Trafficking in Firearms |
Author: Osorio, Javier Title: Hobbes on Drugs: Understanding Drug Violence in Mexico Summary: This dissertation analyzes the unprecedented eruption of organized criminal violence in Mexico. To understand the dynamics of drug violence, this dissertation addresses three questions. What explains the onset of the war on drugs in Mexico? Once the conflict starts, why does drug violence escalate so rapidly? And lastly, why is there subnational variation in the concentration of violence? Based on a game theoretic model, the central argument indicates that democratization erodes the peaceful configurations between the state and criminal organizations and motivates authorities to fight crime, thus triggering a wave of violence between the state and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups fighting to control strategic territories. In this account, state action is not neutral: law enforcement against a criminal group generates the opportunity for a rival criminal organization to invade its territory, thus leading to violent interactions among rival criminal groups. These dynamics of violence tend to concentrate in territories favorable for the reception, production and distribution of drugs. In this way, the disrupting effect of law enforcement unleashes a massive wave of violence of all-against-all resembling a Hobbesian state of war. To test the observable implications of the theory, the empirical assessment relies on a novel database of geo-referenced daily event data at municipal level providing detailed information on who did what to whom, when and where in the Mexican war on drugs. This database covers all municipalities of the country between 2000 and 2010, thus comprising about 9.8 million observations. The creation of this fine-grained database required the development of Eventus ID, a novel software for automated coding of event data from text in Spanish. The statistical assessment relies on quasi-experimental identification strategies and time-series analysis to overcome problems of causal inference associated with analyzing the distinct - yet overlapping - processes of violence between government authorities and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups. In addition, the statistical analysis is complemented with insights from fieldwork and historical process tracing. Results provide strong support for the empirical implications derived from the theoretical model. Details: Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2013. 485p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Shelf Number: 150551 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Germa-Bel Title: A two-sided coin: Disentangling the economic effects of the 'War on drugs' in Mexico Summary: Mexican President Felipe Calderon was sworn into office in December 2006. From the outset, his administration was to deploy an aggressive security policy in its fight against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), in what became known as the Mexican 'War on Drugs'. The policy was strongly condemned because of the 68,000 unintentional deaths directly attributable to it. Here, we evaluate the economic effects of this 'War on Drugs'. To disentangle the economic effects of the policy, we study the effects of homicides and the rise in the homicide rate together with the impact of federal public security grants and state-level military expenditure on economic growth. Using spatial econometrics, we find that at the state-level the number of homicides reduced the Mexican states' GDP per capita growth by 0.20 percentage points, while the growth in the homicide rate increased the states' per capita GDP by 0.81 percentage points. The government's efforts to fight DTOs had a positive and highly significant impact on economic growth. Details: Barcelona: Research Institute of Applied Economics, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 2016/11 : Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2016/201611.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2016/201611.pdf Shelf Number: 146289 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug WarsDrug-Related ViolenceEconomics of CrimeHomicides |
Author: Gutierrez-Romero, Roxana Title: Estimating the impact of Mexican drug cartels on crime Summary: We estimate the impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides on crime and perceptions of security in Mexico. Since the location where drug cartels operate might be endogenous, we combine the difference-in-difference estimator with instrumental variables. Using surveys on crime victimization we find that people living in areas that experienced drug-related homicides are more likely to take extra security precautions. Yet, these areas are also more likely to experience certain crimes, particularly thefts and extortions. In contrast, these crimes and perceptions of insecurity do not change in areas where cartels operate without leading to drug-related homicides. Details: Bellaterra: University Autonoma de Barcelona, Departament d'Economia Aplicada; 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://www.ecap.uab.es/RePEc/doc/wpdea1406.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.ecap.uab.es/RePEc/doc/wpdea1406.pdf Shelf Number: 141060 Keywords: Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking Drug Violence Drug-Related ViolenceHomicides Organized Crime |
Author: Magaloni, Beatriz Title: The Mexican War on Drugs: Crime and the Limits of Government Persuasion Summary: In order to successfully battle organized crime, governments require a certain degree of citizens' support. Governments are sometimes able to influence citizens' opinions, but sometimes they are not. Under what circumstances do pro-government frames influence citizens' opinions? Will individuals who are victims of crime be equally sensitive to frames than those who are not? We argue that crime victimization desensitizes citizens to pro-government frames. This further complicates governments' fights against criminals, creating a vicious circle of insecurity, distrust, and frustrated policy interventions. To test our argument, we conducted a frame experiment embedded in a nationwide survey in Mexico. The empirical evidence supports our argument in most circumstances; yet desensitization is moderated by love media-exposure and identification with the president's party. Details: Stanford, CA: Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: CDDRL Working Paper no. 144: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/144.Romero_Magaloni_Diazcayeros_frameeffects_v6.0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/144.Romero_Magaloni_Diazcayeros_frameeffects_v6.0.pdf Shelf Number: 141226 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: Brown, Ryan Title: Impact of Violent Crime on Risk Aversion: Evidence from the Mexican Drug War Summary: Whereas attitudes towards risk are thought to play an important role in many decisions over the life-course, factors that affect those attitudes are not fully understood. Using longitudinal survey data collected in Mexico before and during the Mexican war on drugs, we investigate how an individual's risk attitudes change with variation in levels of insecurity and uncertainty brought on by unprecedented changes in local-area violent crime due to the war on drugs. Exploiting the fact that the timing, virulence and spatial distribution of changes in violent crime were unanticipated, we establish the changes can plausibly be treated as exogenous in models that also take into account unobserved characteristics of individuals that are fixed over time. As local-area violent crime increases, there is a rise in risk aversion that is distributed through the entire local population. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper No. 23181: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23181.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23181.pdf Shelf Number: 141337 Keywords: Drug Enforcement PolicyDrug-Related ViolenceRisk-Taking BehaviorViolent CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: Taheri-Keramati, Yashar Title: Drugs, Police Inefficiencies, and Gangsterism in Violently Impoverished Communities like Overcome Summary: This research establishes an understanding of the relationship between gangsterism, the drug commodity and inefficiencies in the state's policing institution, as well as the consequences of this relationship, in the context of Overcome squatter area in Cape Town. Overcome is representative of other violently impoverished Cape Town communities with its high rate of unemployment, low quality of education, domestic abuse, stagnant housing crisis, lack of access to intellectual and material resources or opportunities for personal growth, gangsterism, inefficient policing, substance-dependency, and violence. This research demonstrates that the current relationship between the gangs, drugs and the police fosters an unpredictable, violent environment, leaving residents in a constant state of vulnerability. The argument is developed around three key historical junctures in the development of organized crime in South Africa, starting with the growth of the mining industry in the Witwatersrand after 1886, followed by forced removals and prohibition like policies in Cape Town circa 1970, and finally the upheaval created around transition away from apartheid in 1994. Research for this paper was both quantitative and qualitative in nature, and included expert interviews on the subjects of police criminality, narcotic sales, and gangsterism. Newspapers articles, crime statistics, books, census figures, and a host of journals were also utilized. Upon reviewing a host of police inefficiencies and criminal collusions, the research concludes that public criminals related to the state, such as police, and private criminals, such as gangsters, work together in a multitude of ways in a bid to acquire wealth, most notably through an illicit drug market today dominated by 'tik'. It is shown that this violent narcotics market binds police and gangsters together at the expense of creating a state of insecurity for those living in poor drug markets. Details: Cape Town: University of Cape Town, 2013. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/3536/thesis_hsf_2013_taheri-keramati_y.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: South Africa URL: https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/3536/thesis_hsf_2013_taheri-keramati_y.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 141342 Keywords: Drug marketsDrug-Related ViolenceGangsOrganized CrimePovertySocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolent Crime |
Author: Zimmer, Jacqueline Nicole Title: The New Orleans murder epidemic: Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida on the irresponsibility of violence Summary: I live on Jeannette Street in New Orleans, about fifty yards from where Joseph Massenburg's body was found on the night of April first. On a fence close to where Massenburg lost his life, I recently noticed a sign depicting the Biblical imperative "Thou shall not kill". I have come across these signs around New Orleans since the end of 2012 – they can be found plastered to the façade of churches or displayed as yard signs in front lawns – but this was the first time I considered the irreverent tone of the commandment for the people of New Orleans. What exactly is achieved by posting this message across various public buildings around the city? Does it convey to the city's most dangerous criminals that the community is fed up with the killing? In theory, the placards are intended to evoke a moral response from those individuals who are most likely to engage in activities associated with gun violence. More often than not, these individuals are young, black, and male, and are in some way affiliated with the "narcoeconomy" of New Orleans. Even if the commandment "thou shall not kill" does give some people momentary pause, ultimately its message is devoid of the logical connection between murder and the imperative to not murder. If nothing else, the signs serve as ironic reminders that the slaughter of so many of New Orleans' black citizens is a phenomenon that consistently crowns New Orleans the most deadly city in the United States. On the surface, the murder of eighteen-year old Joseph Massenburg, who was shot in cold blood on the corner of Eagle and Birch Streets, appeared to be anything but unusual considering his victim profile. Massenburg looked like the typical victim of gun violence: black, young, and male. However, information detailing Massenburg's other attributes – a Chicago-born recent New Orleans transplant, an Americorps volunteer, a high school graduate, the son of a highly educated public servant – was not released to the public until a few days after Massenburg had succumbed to his gunshot wounds. Massenburg had gone for a walk in the same area where a bitter feud was underway between two local gangs, the "Hot Glocks" and the "Mid-City Killers". Several months later, the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) charged eighteen-year old Glen Emerson with shooting Joseph Massenburg. Police concluded that Emerson, a member of the Mid-City Killers, had mistakenly identified Massenburg as a member of the Hot Glocks in a drive-by shooting. Massenburg's death symbolizes the endemic gun violence problem that has plagued the city of New Orleans for several decades. The drug and gang-related violence that affects many impoverished black neighborhoods in New Orleans is the modern-day product of a composite of factors, including racial inequity, an untrustworthy police force that is rife with corruption, the prevalence of guns and the ease of gun accessibility, and the successive generations of young men who have grown up in broken, impoverished families with few legitimate economic opportunities. While the problems that characterize New Orleans’s impoverished neighborhoods are comparable to other American urban communities, the murder epidemic of New Orleans is unique to cities of its size. While gang-related gun violence is responsible for a significant number of the city's murders each year, a significant number of the city's homicides result from interpersonal conflicts. In order to combat the conditions that lead to deadly gun violence, the city must be willing to reinstate the legitimacy of the police force, whose corruption and inefficiency has led some New Orleans’ citizens to resort to alternative means of attaining "justice". This essay investigates the conditions that created the "street code" that governs drug-related activity among New Orleans' criminal groups and gangs, and why New Orleans' murder rate is directly linked to the manifestation of the street code. The street code is formulated by a variety of factors and sentiments, including poverty, race, hopelessness, fear, anger, boredom, and a distrust in the police. I argue that people resort to extreme forms of violence when environmental and contextual factors corrupt Emmanuel Lévinas' conception of the face-to-face encounter by priming people automatically to reduce the other to the same as a means of self-protection when the absence of a reliable protective state corrupts the ethical decision to regard the other peacefully. Furthermore, I refer to Jacques Derrida's theoretical approach on hospitality to examine how such collective norms foster a culture of violence. Details: Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2014. 115p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1965&context=gradschool_theses Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1965&context=gradschool_theses Shelf Number: 141351 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesMurdersSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Persuaduraan Korban Napza Indonesia (PKNI) Title: Women speak out: Understanding women who inject drugs in Indonesia Summary: The needs of women who inject drugs have largely been ignored by existing programmes and policies in Indonesia. The Indonesian Drug Users Network supported the implementation of the Perempuan Bersuara study to explore health needs, sexual and injecting risk behaviours, gender-based violence, contact with law enforcement, and harm reduction service accessibility among more than 700 women who inject drugs across multiple sites in West Java, Greater Jakarta, and Banten province. As people who use and inject drugs and direct beneficiaries of Indonesia's harm reduction and HIV response, we feel that the complex needs of women in our community have been neglected for far too long. There is an urgent need to develop gender-sensitive, low-threshold programmes and evidence-based drug policies that accommodate and respond to the specific needs of this group. Details: s.l.: Indonesian Drug Users Network, 2016. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2017 at: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/566349360/library/WomenSpeakOut_English_Web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/566349360/library/WomenSpeakOut_English_Web.pdf Shelf Number: 144592 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug-Related ViolenceFemale Drug UsersGender-Specific Programs |
Author: Hallworth, John Title: 'County Lines': An exploratory analysis of migrating drug gang offenders in North Essex Summary: 'County Lines' has become popular law enforcement vernacular in England and Wales, used to describe a rapidly expanding, modus operandi for the supply of controlled drugs by gangs. 'County Lines' have not previously undergone any detailed study. Consequently, definition and targeting of the phenomenon remains flawed. This study examined County Line (CL) gang members encountered by Essex Constabulary, a police force in the East of England, between April 2015 and April 2016. The objectives were to identify the demographic and criminal careers of these gang members and examine how they differed from non-County Line offenders (NCL). Using the Cambridge Crime Harm Index (CCHI) as an instrument of harm and severity measurement, the study then sought to illuminate who should be targeted for maximum crime harm reduction. The study found CL offenders to be more demographically consistent, more violent and more dangerous than NCL counterparts. They originated from a diverse gang landscape, travelling great distances for the most lucrative criminal markets. CL offenders are first arrested and convicted at a younger age. They commit less total, yet significantly more harmful, offences on average than NCL offenders. The study suggests CL offenders have larger criminal networks, and pay a higher price for their criminal enterprise, being more likely to die than NCL offenders, despite being less likely to abuse substances, have an ailment or suffer mental ill health. A further notable conclusion is that CL offenders age-harm relationship shows a marked secondary spike between the ages of 25-28 years of age. This is indicative of an escalation in seriousness, correlative to the de-escalation in volume of offences committed. The findings reveal many important policy implications. Most significantly, they inform an evidence-based, proactive targeting of scarce resources against the most directly harmful suppliers of drugs, providing a foundation from which operational commanders can apply a triage suppliers of drugs, providing a foundation from which operational commanders can apply a triage methodology to target selection. Details: Cambridge, UK: Selwyn College, 2016. 122p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/John%20Hallworth.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/John%20Hallworth.pdf Shelf Number: 144947 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug and Crime Drug Markets Drug Offenders Drug-Related ViolenceGangs Harm Index |
Author: Count the Costs Title: The War on Drugs: Undermining international development and security, increasing conflict. The War on Drugs: Are we paying too high a price? Summary: Attempts to control global drug production and supply took their current form with the 1961 UN single convention on drugs. Whilst this international agreement was promoted with public health goals, it took a prohibitionist approach, based on police and military enforcement intended to suppress production and supply, and punish users. However, prohibiting a commodity for which there is high demand inevitably creates profit opportunities for criminal entrepreneurs, pushing production, supply and consumption into an illicit parallel economy. The negative effects invariably fall hardest on the poorest and most marginalised, including indigenous populations and ethnic minorities, young people and women. The same corrosive consequences historically seen in drug producing regions are now increasingly replicated in drug transit regions as traffickers trans-ship drugs through the Caribbean, Central America, Central Asia and West Africa. Evidence from around the globe shows that enforcement at best displaces illicit markets and transit routes to new areas, and at worst actually increases the violence and harm it is intended to stop. In short, the inevitable result of drug markets being entirely controlled by organised criminal profiteers is to lock vulnerable producing or transit regions into multi-dimensional underdevelopment, where existing problems are exacerbated, and governance further undermined. Details: London: Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2017. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Development_and_security_briefing.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.countthecosts.org/sites/default/files/Development_and_security_briefing.pdf Shelf Number: 144990 Keywords: Costs of Criminal Justice Drug Abuse and Addiction Drug Enforcement Drug Trafficking Drug-Related ViolencePoverty War on Drugs |
Author: Fuentes, Johanan Rivera Title: Crime Hype in Mexico: A fierce battle for attention Summary: The way media covers drug-related violence in Mexico generates more violence because it responds to the publicity-seeking behavior of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). My analysis shows that excessive media coverage in violent states translates into more narcomantas and that high numbers of narcomantas are positively and strongly correlated with high levels of violence. The incentive for DTOs to 'publish' a narcomanta in response to media coverage in violent states is three times larger than in states with average violence. My projections show that in extremely violent states a shock in coverage generates an average increase of 1.6 narcomantas during the following week. DTOs use media attention to build reputation and increase the perception of insecurity. The way media covers violence in Mexico is generating feelings of fear and danger in the population. The 2011 Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico shows that common offenses such as house robberies and street assaults have not changed much since the early 2000s. However, insecurity perception has increased to the point that, today, over 80 percent of the population is afraid of being victims of these crimes. Fear and insecurity perception can make the population an easy target for extortion, local authorities an easy target for corruption and hinder reporting. The situation is now at a point where action is needed. The best method for promoting a more responsible behavior while protecting media freedom is self-regulation since it originates from a multi-stakeholder open discussion on editorial guidelines and accountability mechanisms. I recommend the following next steps should be taken in the next six months to build a strong self-regulatory media environment: - Create a code of editorial guidelines to reporting on publicity-seeking crimes. Each code of ethics responds to the peculiarities of the media and its context, hence it can be tailored to the sensitivities of the Mexican society and democracy. - Institute a self-regulatory body that oversees completion of the code and has a complaint system open to the public. These bodies can have different forms such as ombudsmen, press councils, editorial committees, etc. - Introduce training programs for journalists. Good reporting on publicity-seeking crimes requires a lengthier and more thoughtful narrative. Additionally, journalists reporting on violence and conflict should know how to assess risks in threatening environments and be trained in digital as well as physical security. - Design a campaign to raise awareness among the population. Raising awareness is about creating civic engagement. Without civil engagement self-regulation compliance becomes almost impossible. Setting up a self-regulatory system will prevent the media from furthering DTOs objectives. This will help raise professional standards, strengthen the social standing of journalism in the country while increasing the quality of information people receive and reducing publicity-seeking violence. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2013. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2017 at: http://ksghauser.harvard.edu/index.php/content/download/66767/1239878/version/1/file/SYPA_JohananRivera_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://ksghauser.harvard.edu/index.php/content/download/66767/1239878/version/1/file/SYPA_JohananRivera_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 145247 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceFear of CrimeHomicidesKidnappingsMedia and CrimePublicityViolent Crime |
Author: Monteiro, Joana Title: Effects of Natural Resource Abundance and Neighborhood Violence on Economic Development Summary: This thesis is comprised of three articles. The first two chapters study the effects of natural resource abundance on economic development by analyzing Brazil's offshore oil boom and the distribution of royalties to municipalities. In the first chapter, we examine the impact of this oil boom on local economies. We show that oil production has little economic impact on the municipalities, other than in the public sector. By far, the most important effect is on the number of public employees, which increased a great deal from 1997 to 2006. Few improvements were found on health and educational services. The second chapter analyzes oil effects on local politics. We show evidence that oil does not make leaders unaccountable and that a democratic system is crucial to avoid the negative effects of resource abundance. Our results indicate that, although oil windfall creates a large incumbency advantage in the short run, voters reward incumbents by reappointing them to office as long as they are not completely informed of the size of the extraordinary revenue and see increases in public employment as an indication of mayor's ability. In the medium run, as information about the resources increases and a larger public sector does not translate into more public goods and services, citizens oust the incumbent and select new candidates. The third chapter investigates a different subject. We analyze the relationship between neighborhood violence and school achievement, by exploring time and geographical variation in Rio de Janeiro's drug battles. We find that schools close to areas that experience more variation in armed conflicts over time perform worse in standardized math exams, while no significant effect is found on language exams. Violent events are also associated with an increase in grade repetition and dropout for 5th graders. In terms of mobility across schools, we find no significant effects of violence on students' transfers and new admissions during the school year. We also discuss the mechanisms that can explain these results and provide evidence that violence is associated with an increase in teacher absenteeism. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro,, 2010. 149p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 10, 2017 at: http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/dlstatic/10112/1806097/DLFE-237573.pdf/JoanaC.M.MonteiroDMH.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/dlstatic/10112/1806097/DLFE-237573.pdf/JoanaC.M.MonteiroDMH.pdf Shelf Number: 131177 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceEconomic Development Natural Resources Neighborhoods and Crime |
Author: Aziani, Alberto Title: Shrinking businesses and expanding graveyards: how fluctuations in the value of cocaine markets influence the recourse to lethal violence Summary: Many scholars have investigated the escalation of violence associated with drug trafficking. Despite the plethora of literature, limited attention has been paid to the consequences of fluctuations in the value of markets. This study addresses this lacuna in extant research by proposing an original estimate of the gross value added of cocaine markets in 151 countries between the period 1998-2013, taking into consideration both national and international dimensions of cocaine trafficking through recourse to a flow/network approach. In conjunction with this, the fluctuation of the gross value added of the cocaine market is examined in terms of an etiological factor in the upsurge of interpersonal lethal violence. The analysis demonstrates how expansions and contractions of the gross value added in cocaine markets are significant determinants of the level of violence within the respective countries that constitute the global cocaine network. Finally, through mobilising innovative methods for estimating drug law enforcement actions, the study problematizes extant methods for disrupting drug trafficking on the basis that they may, paradoxically, engender cycles of violence. Details: Milan: UNIVERSITA CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE, 2016. 287p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: https://tesionline.unicatt.it/bitstream/10280/17473/1/Alberto%20Aziani%20_%20PhD%20Thesis.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://tesionline.unicatt.it/bitstream/10280/17473/1/Alberto%20Aziani%20_%20PhD%20Thesis.pdf Shelf Number: 145472 Keywords: CocaineDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomics of Crime |
Author: Ameripol Title: Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking: Police Point of View: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru Summary: A new study from the Americas regional police association Ameripol explores the shifting dynamics of the global drug trade, as new trafficking routes and criminal networks emerge to meet the demands of evolving consumer markets. The report (pdf), entitled "Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking - A Police Perspective," is a collaboration between the American Police Community (Ameripol), an association of police from around the region, and the European Union (EU), focusing on the drug trade in the three main coca production countries -- Peru, Colombia and Bolivia -- as well as key transit countries. One of the most notable aspects of the report is its plotting of the rise of new trafficking routes to meet the needs of ever changing drug consumer markets around the globe. Most of these rely on maritime transport, which the report classifies as "the biggest drug trafficking threat." Many of these routes now run through Brazil, which is now the world's second largest consumer of cocaine and a key transit point for shipments destined for Europe. The report examines both the traditional and developing trafficking routes that take cocaine from production countries to the cities of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and the northeast of the country, where it is processed, then either sold locally or exported. At the heart of many of the routes sits Manaus, the capital of Amazonas state and a critical thoroughfare for drugs arriving from Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. The report highlights the cross-pollination of illegal activities in the Amazon region, noting that pilots involved in drug flights are also often involved in the illegal mining that blights the region. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Ameripol, 2013. Source: Internet Resource: Available at the Rutgers Criminal Justice Library. Year: 2013 Country: South America URL: Shelf Number: 131271 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceIllegal Mining |
Author: Couch, Neil Title: 'Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse'. Reality or Exaggeration? Summary: More than 55,000 people have been killed in Mexico's vicious drug wars between 2006 and 2011. The Pentagon's Joint Operating Environment Paper 2008 speculated that the country was one of two major states at risk of rapid and sudden collapse. This paper investigates the potential causes of state failure and the extent to which these are present in Mexico today as a result of corruption and violent, lucrative organised crime. It explains the mutual dependency between the two and shows how deeply entrenched and extensive their power and influence have become at all levels of government and in key state institutions. It examines progress in the National Security Strategy and the impact of crime and corruption on key strategic measures of success. It concludes that the Pentagon's failure to understand the nature of the conflict led to a gross overstatement of the risk to the country. It also demonstrates, however, that crime and corruption threaten the transitional democracy that has emerged in Mexico since the turn of the century. Finally, it raises questions regarding the reliability and general applicability of some theories of state failure, state legitimacy and civil-military relations. Details: London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2012. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Seaford House Paper: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/mexico-in-danger-of-rapid-collapse-reality-or-exaggeration-14620 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.da.mod.uk/Publications/category/90/mexico-in-danger-of-rapid-collapse-reality-or-exaggeration-14620 Shelf Number: 131268 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug WarsDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Collodi, Jason Title: External stresses in West Africa: Cross-border Violence and Cocaine Trafficking Summary: The 2011 World Development Report on conflict, security and development highlights the centrality of 'external stresses' for generating insecurity and increasing the risk of violence in fragile areas. West African states are particularly vulnerable, with serious concerns around cross-border violence and illicit drug-trafficking. Policy responses need to: tackle the region's recent legacy of conflict and violent upheaval; address weak governance and entrenched corruption; improve regional cooperation; and support border and outlying communities that have been marginalised by insecurity, poverty and unemployment. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2014. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: IDS Policy Briefing 60: Accessed June 7, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3858/External%20Stresses%20in%20West%20Africa%20cross-border%20violence%20and%20cocaine%20trafficking.pdf;jsessionid=706100FE21470352417E0571F8249D73?sequence=1 Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3858/External%20Stresses%20in%20West%20Africa%20cross-border%20violence%20and%20cocaine%20trafficking.pdf;jsessionid=706100FE21470352417E0571F8249D73?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 145950 Keywords: CocaineConflict-Related ViolenceDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceViolence |
Author: Sands, Gary P. Title: Invisible victims: The war on drugs in America's ghettos Summary: In 1971, the United States federal government, under the leadership of President Richard Nixon, declared war on urban crime and illegal drugs. The war has perpetuated and fed itself. Vast quantities of money and assets seized from individuals involved in the drug trade have funded a massive militarization of American police departments. Increasingly, African-Americans and predominately African-American neighborhoods have been targeted in the crackdowns on illegal narcotics. African-Americans have become significantly overrepresented in drug courts, jails, prisons, and parole systems as a result of the war. Urban African-American society has suffered social disorganization and a concentrated disadvantage due to the absence of jobs, absence of community services, and the forced removal of significant portions of the community due to mass incarceration. Drug prohibition has sparked violence in the African-American community much in the same ways that alcohol prohibition sparked violence in the 1920's. The drug war has failed to legislate morality any more effectively than did the vii Volstead Act. Every war has its invisible victims. The War on Drugs has made invisible victims of millions of African-Americans. Details: West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, 2017. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed June 15, 2017 at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/dissertations/AAI10151635/ Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/dissertations/AAI10151635/ Shelf Number: 146187 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceDrugs and Crime Illegal Drugs Minority Groups Neighborhoods and Crime Poverty Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime War on Drugs |
Author: Rosenfeld, Richard Title: Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States Summary: Big-city homicides rose in 2015 and again in 2016, although not all cities experienced a large increase, and homicides fell in some cities. We consider two explanations of the homicide rise as guides for future research: (1) expansion in illicit drug markets brought about by the heroin and synthetic opioid epidemic and (2) widely referenced "Ferguson effects" resulting in de-policing, compromised police legitimacy, or both. Larger increases in drug-related homicides than in other types of homicide provide preliminary evidence that expansions in illicit drug markets contributed to the overall homicide rise. The current drug epidemic is disproportionately concentrated in the white population, and homicides have increased among whites as well as among AfricanAmericans and Hispanics. We surmise, therefore, that the drug epidemic may have had an especially strong influence on the rise in homicide rates among whites. Current evidence that links de-policing to the homicide rise is mixed at best. Surveys of police reveal widespread concerns about increased police-community tensions and reductions in proactive policing in the aftermath of widely publicized deadly encounters between the police and African-Americans. Increases in homicide followed decreases in arrests in Baltimore and Chicago, although it is not known whether the same was true in other cities. Nationwide, arrest-offense ratios and arrest clearance rates decreased in 2015, but they had been declining for several years when homicide rates were falling. The extent of de-policing and its possible connection to the recent homicide rise remain open research questions. Survey evidence reveals greater discontent with the police among African-Americans than among whites. Alienation from the police can result in a decreased willingness to contact them when a crime occurs or to cooperate in police investigations and, some studies suggest, an increase in criminal behavior. One study has shown that calls for police service fell after a controversial violent encounter between the police and an unarmed AfricanAmerican in Milwaukee. The reduction in calls for service was greater in African-American neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. The rate at which the police are contacted is only one of several indicators needed to measure any connection between diminished police legitimacy and the recent rise in homicides. Details: Final report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2017. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251067.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251067.pdf Shelf Number: 148529 Keywords: Crime Rates Drug-Related ViolenceHomicides Murders Opioid Epidemic Violent Crime |
Author: Murphy, Tommy E. Title: Following the Poppy Trail: Causes and Consequences of Mexican Drug Cartels Summary: We study the historical origins and consequences of Mexican cartels. We first trace the location of current cartels to the location of Chinese migration at the beginning of the XX century, and document that both events are strongly connected. We then use Chinese presence in 1930 as an instrument for cartel presence today. We find a positive link between cartel presence and good socioeconomic outcomes, such as lower marginalization rates, lower illiteracy rates, higher salaries, and better public services. We also report that municipalities with cartel presence have higher tax revenues and more political competition. Given that Chinese immigration at the end of the century was driven by elements largely exogenous to the drug trade, the link between cartel presence and good socioeconomic outcomes can be interpreted in a causal way. Previous research has shown that the presence of organized crime is associated with bad outcomes at the macro level (Pinotti, 2015) and has deep effects at individual level, making children more likely to be criminals in adulthood (Sviatschi, 2017a; 2017b). Our paper reconciles this previous literature with the fact that drug lords, the leaders of this particular form of organized crime, have great support in the local communities in which they operate. Details: Buenos Aires, Argentina: Universidad de San Andres, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2018 at: ftp://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc130.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: ftp://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc130.pdf Shelf Number: 148851 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomics of CrimeOpium Poppy CultivationOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Webster, Daniel W. Title: Estimating the Effects of Law Enforcement and Public Health Interventions Intended to Reduce Gun Violence in Baltimore Summary: Baltimore has long been plagued by high rates of homicides, with guns playing an important role. City and law enforcement officials in Baltimore have attributed much of the gun violence to the illegal drug economy and the availability of guns for criminal use. For many years, the most visible and direct approaches employed by the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) to curb gun violence have focused on enforcement of drug laws to reduce violent crime associated with the drug trade. In the most ambitious and resource-intensive efforts, the objective of law enforcement actions has been to "take down" or severely weaken organized groups selling illegal drugs through targeted arrests and prosecutions. Such efforts are intended to both remove violent criminals from communities and, ideally, deter violent crime. Most of these targeted drug law enforcement efforts have been placefocused, targeting "hot spots" for homicides and shootings. Within these hot spots, there is often some degree of targeting of individuals believed to be important drivers of gun violence, based on intelligence gathered, individuals' histories of criminal offending, and individuals' criminal associates. In the early 2000s, Baltimore City leadership encouraged aggressive enforcement of drug laws, resulting in the arrests of tens of thousands of individuals for drug possession and drug distribution. However, beginning mid-2007, the BPD shifted its focus to initiatives aimed at apprehending violent criminals and targeting illegal gun possession. We used data from January 1, 2003, through December 23, 2017, to estimate the effects of place-focused policing and prevention initiatives that were focused on criminal offending involving guns and/or drugs to estimate the effects of those interventions on homicides and nonfatal shootings. An overview of the specific interventions assessed in this study follows. Details: Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research; Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2018. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2018 at: https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/JHSPH-Gun-Violence-in-Baltimore.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/JHSPH-Gun-Violence-in-Baltimore.pdf Shelf Number: 149142 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesHotspots PolicingIllegal DrugsPublic Health Interventions |
Author: InSight Crime Title: MS13 in the Americas: How the World's Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction Summary: The Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) is one of the world's largest and arguably most violent street gangs. After relatively humble beginnings in Los Angeles in the 1980s, it has spread to more than a half-dozen countries and become a central focus of law enforcement in two hemispheres. In spite of these efforts, the MS13 remains a persistent threat and shows signs of expanding its criminal portfolio. This report attempts to explain what makes the MS13 such a difficult problem for authorities to tackle. It focuses on assisting law enforcement's understanding of the gang's criminal activities, but it includes deep discussion on the social and political issues around the MS13. Below are our major findings. The MS13 is a largely urban phenomenon that has cells operating in two continents. The MS13 has between 50,000 and 70,000 members who are concentrated in mostly urban areas in Central America or locations outside the region where there is a large Central American diaspora. In Honduras and Guatemala, the gang is still largely urban. In El Salvador, however, the gang has steadily spread into more rural areas. Expansion beyond urban areas has also happened in places in the United States, most notably in Long Island and North Carolina, and increasingly California. The gang has appeared as well in Europe, specifically in urban areas of Spain and Italy. The size of the gang in these settings varies greatly and fluctuates, mostly in accordance with law enforcement efforts and migration patterns unrelated to the gang. The MS13 is a social organization first, and a criminal organization second. The MS13 is a complex phenomenon. The gang is not about generating revenue as much as it is about creating a collective identity that is constructed and reinforced by shared, often criminal experiences, especially acts of violence and expressions of social control. The MS13 draws on a mythic notion of community, a team concept, and an ideology based on its bloody fight with its chief rival, the Barrio 18 (18th Street) gang, to sustain a huge, loosely organized social and criminal organization. The MS13 is a diffuse organization of sub-parts, with no single leader or leadership structure that directs the entire gang. The MS13 has two poles of power: in Los Angeles, where it was founded, and in El Salvador, its spiritual birthplace where many of its historic leaders reside. But the gang has no single leader or leadership council. Instead it is a federation with layers of leaders who interact, obey and react to each other at different moments depending on circumstances. In general terms, most decisions are made by the individual cell, or what is known as the "clica," the Spanish term for clique. The highest-ranking members in some geographic areas make up a leadership council, but not all areas have a leadership council. In Los Angeles, the MS13 is subservient to the prison gang known as the Mexican Mafia. In El Salvador, the gang is also run from prison by its own leadership council. Along the East Coast of the United States, the gang has no council, although it is takes much of its directives from Salvadoran-based gang leaders. Because these leaders are mostly in jail, it is exceedingly difficult for them to impose total control over the rank-and-file. The MS13 has guidelines more than rules, which are subject to varying interpretations. The diffuse nature of the organization has widespread implications for how it operates. The gang has guidelines more than rules. These guidelines are subject to haphazard interpretations and application. In other words, this internal justice is not necessarily a strict system and often depends more on who the leader is and who is being judged, rather the actual transgression or the circumstances surrounding it. This inconsistent application of the rules leads to constant internal and external conflicts and is the cause of widespread violence wherever the gang operates. MS13 violence is brutal and purposeful. Violence is at the heart of the MS13 and is what has made it a target of law enforcement in the United States, Central America and beyond. It is central to the MS13's ethos, its modus operandi, and its evaluation and discipline of its own members. Violence also builds cohesion and comradery within the gang's cliques. This use of violence has enhanced the MS13's brand name, allowing it to expand in size and geographic reach, but it has undermined its ability to enter more sophisticated, money-making criminal economies. Potential partners see the gang as an unreliable, highly visible target, and the gang's violent spasms only reinforce this notion. The MS13's diffuse nature makes it hard for it to control its own expressions of violence. The MS13's diffuse nature has made it difficult to curtail its violence. The gang itself has attempted to implement rules to control the use of force. Most murders must be sanctioned from the highest levels, but as one of our case studies illustrates, this is often a perfunctory task, reflecting what seems to be a disregard for human life. In addition, the very system that is designed to control the violence often leads to more violence, since failure to carry out a sanctioned hit becomes cause for internal disciplinary action. The MS13 is a hand-to-mouth criminal organization that depends on control of territory to secure revenue. The gang's lack of a centralized leadership has kept it relatively impoverished. While it has established revenue streams, the MS13 has a hand-to-mouth criminal portfolio. Extortion is the single most important revenue stream for the gang in Central America, although a significant and rising portion of the MS13's criminal portfolio comes from local drug peddling, especially in US cities such as Los Angeles. The gang is also involved in prostitution, human smuggling, car theft and resale and other criminal activities, but the gang's revenue nearly always depends on its ability to control territory. The MS13 is a transnational gang, not a transnational criminal organization (TCO). While the gang has a presence in two continents and at least a half-dozen nations, the gang is a small, part-time role player in international criminal schemes. In cases of international drug trafficking, for instance, the MS13 is dependent on other criminal actors such as the Mexican Mafia. The gang plays a similar, part-time role in other international criminal activities such human smuggling as well. Its diffuse organizational structure and public displays of violence are two of the main reasons why the gang has not succeeded in transforming itself into a TCO. And while some criminal activity - most notably the MS13's involvement in petty drug dealing on a local level - is driving the gang's maturation process and leading it to new opportunities, this is a slow process that is causing significant conflict within the gang. El Salvador's MS13 leaders are trying to assert more control over the US East Coast. Some MS13 leaders, especially those operating from jails in El Salvador, are trying to create more top-down control, and expand its social and political influence. In El Salvador, the gang has negotiated delivering votes to some of the country's most powerful politicians. They have also instituted more formal and complex command structures inside and outside of jail, and they have emissaries in places as far away as Boston who are trying to corral the rudimentary and undisciplined gang cliques operating along the US East Coast. The MS13 is taking advantage of traditional migration patterns, not sending members to set up new cells. The MS13's efforts in El Salvador have alarmed law enforcement officials who say the gang's high-ranking leaders are also moving their rank-and-file around the region, including to the United States. But while the gang is repopulating cells and establishing new ones, the MS13 appears to be taking advantage of circumstances, rather than actively creating those circumstances. MS13 members migrate for the same reasons that other migrants do, and they go to the same places. They also face many of the same risks such as indigence, isolation, victimization, detention and deportation. This report is divided into five sections. We begin by chronicling the multi-national history of the MS13. The group is the byproduct of war, migration and policy, and it has a footprint in a half dozen nations. We then turn to the gang's philosophy, its guiding principles and ideology. The gang centers itself around the idea of community, which is reinforced mostly via violent rituals and expressions of rage towards outsiders and rivals. From there, we move to organizational structure. This includes explaining the largely misunderstood loose hierarchy of the gang and its clique system. Then we cover modus operandi, tackling the all-important questions of recruitment, criminal economy, use of violence, and political and social capital. Finally, we elaborate five case studies, which address the MS13's: 1) organizational structure; 2) use of violence; 3) criminal migration; 4) involvement in international drug trafficking; and 5) political and social capital. Details: s.l.: Insight Crime; Washington, DC: Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, 2018. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 20, 2018 at: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MS13-in-the-Americas-InSight-Crime-English.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Central America URL: https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MS13-in-the-Americas-InSight-Crime-English.pdf Shelf Number: 149182 Keywords: Criminal OrganizationDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceGang-Related ViolenceGangsMara SalvatruchaMS13Prison Gangs |
Author: Coyne, John Title: 'Santa Muerte', are the Mexican cartels really coming? Summary: Whether in Mexico, the US or Australia, the image of the transnational serious and organised crime (OC) threat from 'Mexican cartels' used to construct policy doesn't appear to engage with the reality that there's no homogeneous Mexican cartel, cartels or OC group. In popular culture, the labels 'Mexican cartel' and 'street gang' conjure an image of a highly organised, hierarchically commanded and ultraviolent crime group. Even Mexico's infamous Sinaloa cartel, rumoured to have an increasingly ominous presence in Australia, is more an alliance of criminal figures than a hierarchical organisation. There should be little doubt that these groups, as a collective phenomenon, have consistently demonstrated a propensity to regularly use breathtakingly barbaric violence for revenge and intimidation. Unfortunately, popular characterisations of the structure and organisation of these groups does little justice to the complexity of the threat that they pose. These generalisations lack the necessary granularity to be useful in the development of disruption- and mitigation-focused strategies. For policymakers, it's convenient to conflate well-known US-based Mexican street gangs, transnational street gangs such as the 'Mexican Mafia' and transnational OC groups such as the 'Mexican cartels' into a singular homogeneous threat grouping or strategy: 'the cartels'. It's equally convenient to link all Mexican OC activity together with the cartel thread. With this kind of conflation, the seriousness of the threat at hand can clearly and concisely be communicated to government decision-makers in terms that will ensure funding and strategy responses. Frustration with the inability of law enforcement arrest and seizure strategies to undermine the drug trade and its associated OC has further complicated the policy decision-making in this space. In the US and Mexican governments' cases, it's likely that this frustration has underpinned government policy, thereby expanding the role of the military and intelligence agencies in the 'war on drugs'. Unfortunately, conflating these groups doesn't produce the kinds of policies and strategies that will result in operational activity that has long-term disruption impacts on the groups involved. Moreover, the current understanding arguably does not allow for the involvement and integration of enforcement operations with other whole-of-government social, economic and development strategies. This report argues that, for Australia and Asia, the menace of Mexican OC is no longer looming on the horizon; it has already arrived. However, the nature of the Mexican OC problem in Australia and Asia is not likely to be the same as that found in either the US or Mexico. To fully understand the implications of this development for Australia and the region, this threat needs to be viewed in context. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2017. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed April 2, 2018 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ASPI-SR107_Mexican-cartels.pdf Shelf Number: 149648 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceMexican CartelsOrganized CrimeStreet Gangs |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Serious Violence Strategy Summary: The Government is determined to do all it can to break the deadly cycle of violence that devastates the lives of individuals, families and communities. This strategy sets out how we will respond to serious violence. The strategy consolidates the range of very important work already being taken forward and renews our ambition to go further, setting out a number of significant new proposals. We want to make clear that our approach is not solely focused on law enforcement, very important as that is, but depends on partnerships across a number of sectors such as education, health, social services, housing, youth services, and victim services. In particular it needs the support of communities thinking about what they can themselves do to help prevent violent crime happening in the first place and how they can support measures to get young people and young adults involved in positive activities. Our overarching message is that tackling serious violence is not a law enforcement issue alone. It requires a multiple strand approach involving a range of partners across different sectors. The strategy sets out our analysis of the evidence and the trends and drivers of serious violent crime. The evidence shows that while overall crime continues to fall, homicide, knife crime and gun crime have risen since 2014 across virtually all police force areas in England and Wales. Robbery has also risen sharply since 2016. These increases have been accompanied by a shift towards younger victims and perpetrators. Most of the violence is also male on male. About half the rise in robbery, knife and gun crime is due to improvements in police recording. For the remainder, drug-related cases seem to be an important driver. Between 2014/15 and 2016/17, homicides where either the victim or suspect were known to be involved in using or dealing illicit drugs increased from 50% to 57%. Crack cocaine markets have strong links to serious violence and evidence suggests crack use is rising in England and Wales due to a mix of supply and demand factors. Drug-related cases also seem to be one of the driving factors in the homicide increase in the United States. Drug-market violence may also be facilitated and spread to some extent by social media. A small minority are using social media to glamorise gang or drug-selling life, taunt rivals and normalise weapons carrying. There has also been an increase in vulnerable groups susceptible to the related exploitation and/or drug use. The strategy is framed on four key themes: tackling county lines and misuse of drugs, early intervention and prevention, supporting communities and partnerships, and an effective law enforcement and criminal justice response. This strategy represents a step change in the way we think and respond to serious violence, establishing a new balance between prevention and law enforcement. Given the strong link between drugs and serious violence and the related harm and exploitation from county lines, we have set out the action we will take to tackle this violent and exploitative criminal activity. The Home Office is supporting the development of a new National County Lines Co‑ordination Centre. We will continue to raise awareness of county lines and the related exploitation, and we will provide funding to support delivery of a new round of Heroin and Crack Action Areas. Our work on early intervention and prevention is focused on steering young people away from crime and putting in place measures to tackle the root causes. The Home Office has committed $11 million over the next two years through a new Early Intervention Youth Fund to provide support to communities for early intervention and prevention with young people. We will support Redthread to expand and pilot its Youth Violence Intervention Programme outside London, starting with Nottingham and Birmingham, and to develop its service in major London hospitals. We will also continue to fund Young People's Advocates working with gang-affected young women and girls, and exploring whether the model should be expanded. The Home Office will work with the Department for Education and Ofsted to explore what more can be done to support schools in England to respond to potential crime risks and to provide additional support to excluded children. We need an approach that involves partners across different sectors, including police, local authorities and the private and voluntary sector. Communities and local partnerships will be at the heart of our response. This issue must be understood and owned locally so that all the relevant partners can play their part. We will support local partnerships, working with Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), to galvanise the local response to tackling serious violence and ensure that they are reflecting local challenges within their plans. We have launched a new media campaign raising awareness about the risks of carrying knives. To help communities tackle knife crime, the Home Office is providing up to $1 million for the Community Fund in both 2018/19 and 2019/20, in addition to continuing the Ending Gang Violence and Exploitation (EGVE) Fund and EGVE review programme. We are clear that tackling serious violence is not a law enforcement issue alone and requires partnerships across a range of agencies; however we want to ensure that we are providing the tools to support the law enforcement and criminal justice response. We are planning new legislation to strengthen our controls on knives, corrosive substances and firearms. The Home Office will also work with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Service (HMICFRS) to ensure their PEEL inspections focus on serious violence and support a HMICFRS thematic inspection of county lines in 2018/19. The Home Office has commissioned the Centre for Applied Science and Technology to ensure that the police have the capability to undertake street testing for corrosives. Finally, we will ensure that there is a framework in place to support delivery of the strategy. The Home Office will establish a new cross sector Serious Violence Taskforce with key representatives from a range of national, local and delivery partner agencies to oversee delivery and challenge the impact of delivery of the Serious Violence Strategy. The current Inter-Ministerial Group on Gangs will be refocused to oversee and drive delivery of the strategy. The Home Secretary will also hold an International Violent Crime Symposium to bring together the international academic community to understand the trends in serious violence in different parts of the world. Details: London: Home Office, 2018. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/698009/serious-violence-strategy.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/698009/serious-violence-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 149794 Keywords: Crime PreventionDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Disney, Lynn Title: Illicit Drug Use and Criminal Behavior: A Literature Review Summary: Speculation and case histories about the role of illegal drug use and crime abounds. Turf wars between rival gangs, desperate users seeking resources to supply their habits, injuries resulting from a person high on PCP-are all examples of crimes that occurred as a result of illegal drug use. Look at almost any newspaper and you will find articles discussing these crimes in detail. These accounts rarely apply an empirical framework, and in reality, estimating the proportion of crime attributable to illegal drug use is an area of research where little agreement exists. The purpose of this literature review is to examine evidence-based approaches that have been tested in research and then determine whether defensible methodologies exist for calculating a drug use-attributable fraction for crimes committed in the United States. ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS The precise nature and relationship of these factors is complex. Drugs can produce a variety of symptoms and side effects, depending on the individual. Do mental health problems precede or are they caused by the drug use? Does the criminal behavior occur because the individual is taking drugs or is it a cause of substance use? The answers to these questions differ based on who is taking the drug, the drug being taken, and the environment in which it is taken. A person with schizophrenia may abuse drugs to quell the symptoms of the disease. A woman may abuse drugs to alleviate feelings of inadequacy caused by spousal abuse. A teenager may engage in risky sexual behaviors due to lowered inhibitions caused by using drugs. A heroin addict may commit a burglary to obtain the funds to support his habit. In some cases, the crime would not occur but for the drug use. This paper attempts to tease out the causal relationship between illicit drug use and other forms of criminal behavior. Complicating any examination of the link between illicit drug use and criminal behavior is the tendency to include tobacco use and alcohol in this equation. While these products all may involve some significant risk of criminal behavior, they are outside the scope of this report. To the extent possible, numbers attributed to the use and abuse of tobacco and alcohol will be removed from the analysis. The abuse of prescription drugs as a cause of criminal behavior was not excluded but few studies focused solely on this exposure. Details: Washington, DC; Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2010. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2018 at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/illicit_drug_use_and_criminal_behavior_literature_review_2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/illicit_drug_use_and_criminal_behavior_literature_review_2010.pdf Shelf Number: 150048 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeIllicit Drugs |
Author: Andell, Paul Title: Preventing the Violent and Sexual Victimisation of Vulnerable gang-involved and gang-affected children and young people in Ipswich Summary: A Suffolk Constabulary threat assessment initiated in 2014 observed that the supply of Class A Drugs to Ipswich and other Suffolk towns was dominated by street gangs from London. It notes that children and young people from London and Suffolk were involved in 'running' the drugs to end users and that their risk of coming to harm was high. The Police estimated at this point that a small number of young people, frequently recorded as 'missing' from Care or home by the police and Safeguarding authorities, were either known, or suspected, to be working for London-based drug dealing networks. Children and young people reported 'missing' in London had also been found at Suffolk addresses known to be used for drug dealing. The assessment recognised that in the preceding decade there had been an increase in the numbers of boys and young men travelling from London to Ipswich in order to supply Class A drugs and that members of London-based drug-dealing groups had been present in Ipswich throughout this period despite several successful police operations to disrupt the trafficking and distribution of Class A drugs. The assessment suggested that violence, threats and coercion were used routinely by these groups to exert control over vulnerable children and young people and local Class A drug users whose homes were being 'cuckooed'. This kind of violence was evident in other parts of Suffolk where the illicit drug market was saturated and competition between dealers was fierce. Intelligence also suggested that Organised Crime Groups (OCG's) involved in drug dealing were storing weapons at dealing locations and arming 'runners' with knives. In recognition of these problems, in November 2014, representatives of the government's Ending Gangs and Youth Violence (EGYV) programme were invited to undertake a peer review of the effectiveness of local responses and provide a framework for future action. The EGYV review noted that senior leaders in the County had recognized the serious threat posed by the gang problem and that a range of existing multi-agency initiatives had been put in place. It observed that the Ipswich Borough Police Commander had established a GOLD policing strategy and constructed a complementary multi-agency intervention (Operation Volcanic). However it appeared that lack of clarity vis-a-vis roles and responsibilities within the community safety and other partnerships meant there were no obvious mechanisms to effectively identify, address and communicate a way of dealing with gang offending by the partnership. It also noted that, to date, senior leaders did not have a formal or specific role and that responses were largely Police-led and enforcement-based. Details: Ipswich, UK: University of Suffolk, 2017. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 15, 2018 at: https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/27822/1/Preventing_the_violent_and_sexual_victimisation_of_vulnerable_gang_involved.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/27822/1/Preventing_the_violent_and_sexual_victimisation_of_vulnerable_gang_involved.pdf Shelf Number: 150190 Keywords: Drug DealingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceGangsSexual AssaultVictimization |
Author: Tita, George E. Title: Strategies for Reducing Gun Violence: The Role of Gangs, Drugs and Firearm Accessibility Summary: This report on strategies to reduce gun violence begins with a brief overview of recent trends in gun violence with a particular focus on emerging trends and changes in Canada. A review of literature covers the linkages between gangs, drug markets and firearm accessibility and firearm violence. When possible, the impacts of these factors on patterns of violence are explored at both the individual and community levels. Overall, the report highlights the prevalence and patterns of homicide and gun violence in North America, Britain, Mexico, Canada and other countries. Particular attention is paid to the role of gangs and drug markets in facilitating violence. In addition, research findings and program evaluations aimed at reducing gun violence are also included. Given the exceptionally high rates of interpersonal violence (especially gun violence) within the United States, and its long history of gang violence, it is not surprising that much of the literature is centered on programs and interventions in America. If the current trends of gun violence involving youth continue in Canada, it is important that Canadian policies learn from the successes and failures of recent gun violence reduction strategies elsewhere. Drawing from the literature review as well as the first author's experiences in the design, implementation and evaluation of violence reduction strategies, this report includes a broad set of policy recommendations that might prove useful in the effort to control gun violence within the larger census metropolitan areas (CMAs) in Canada. The case is made that before any policies aimed at reducing gun violence are implemented, it is extremely important to conduct basic research into the nature of local gun and gang violence. One must first understand who is involved, and why they are involved in violence, before one can design and implement an effective gun violence strategy. Finally, the report includes an Annotated Bibliography of the most current and useful gun and gang violence prevention and intervention resources. Details: Ottawa: National Crime Prevention Centre, 2007. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report: 2007-3: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rdcng-gn-vlnc/rdcng-gn-vlnc-eng.pdf Year: 2007 Country: International URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rdcng-gn-vlnc/rdcng-gn-vlnc-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 150241 Keywords: Crime PreventionDrug-Related ViolenceGang ViolenceGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceGuns |
Author: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Title: Drug-related homicide in Europe: a first review of the data and literature Summary: Drugs can act as facilitators for all types of violence, including drug-related homicide (DRH). Addressing this phenomenon is of importance not only given the severity of a homicide event and its high costs to society, but also because DRH has the potential to act as a valuable indicator of wider drug-related violent crime. Comparing DRH levels between countries can be a valuable tool for identifying trends and new threats. As part of its programme for developing and improving drug supply indicators, the EMCDDA has been expanding its monitoring to include measures of wider drug-related crime, including DRH. However, there appears to be a significant gap in the available European data on DRH. This Paper aims to identify relevant European data sources on DRH, to assess the role of drugs in national homicide data, and to assess these sources and data in terms of monitoring potential. A critical review was conducted of existing national and international homicide data sources. Data on DRH is systematically prepared in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom (England, Wales, and Scotland). Available data suggests both between- and within-country variability in relation to the role of drugs in homicide events. Based on these findings, four key obstacles can be identified in terms of the current ability to monitor DRH: missing data, fragmented data, comparability issues and data quality reservations. To overcome these obstacles there is a need to define and operationalise concepts, based on common definitions and integrate them into the EMCDDA monitoring system. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: EMCDDA Papers: Accessed May 30, 2018 at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/8838/20182100_TDAU18001ENN_PDF.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/8838/20182100_TDAU18001ENN_PDF.pdf Shelf Number: 150377 Keywords: Drug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeHomicidesViolent Crime |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: The notorious drug trafficking kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman is now imprisoned in the United States awaiting trial, following the Mexican government's decision to extradite him to the United States on January 19, 2017, the day before President Trump took office. Guzman is charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise and conducting drug-related crimes as the purported leader of the Mexican criminal syndicate commonly known as the Sinaloa cartel. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) maintains that the Sinaloa cartel has the widest reach into U.S. cities of any transnational criminal organization. In November 2016, in its National Drug Threat Assessment, the DEA stated that Mexican drug trafficking groups are working to expand their presence, particularly in the heroin markets inside the United States. Over the years, Mexico"s criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and increasingly the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have been in constant flux. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured. In recent years, the DEA has identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations might be viewed as the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. New crime groups have emerged since the December 2012 inauguration of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and oil syphoning, posing a governance challenge to President Pena Nieto as daunting as that faced by his predecessors. Former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. Such violence appears to be rising again in Mexico. In January 2017, the country registered more homicides than in any January since the government began to release national crime data in the late 1980s. In a single weekend in April 2017, more than 35 died in what was assumed to be drug trafficking-related violence. Although the Mexican government no longer estimates organized crime-related homicides, some independent analysts have claimed that murders linked to organized crime may have exceeded 100,000 since 2006, when President Calderon began his campaign against the DTOs. Mexico's government reported that the annual number of all homicides in Mexico declined after Calderon left office in 2012 by about 16% in 2013 and 15% in 2014, only to rise in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, the Mexican government reported a 22% increase in all homicides to 22,932, almost reaching the high point of nearly 23,000 murders in 2011, Mexico's most violent year. The 115th Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape has been significantly altered by fragmentation and how the organizational shape-shifting continues Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 150740 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal DrugsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Comision Mexicana de Defensa y Promocion de los Derechos Humanos Title: Violaciones graves a derechos humanos en la guerra contra las drogas en Mexico (Human rights violations in the context of the war on drugs in Mexico) Summary: Prohibition policies regarding drugs have failed in their goal of achieving a "drug-free world" and have forced the drug market to remain illegal. This has triggered an illicit market, exclusively controlled by organized crime cartels, who have created links to other criminal markets and use violence as a primary form of regulation. In December 2006, former President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006-2012) launched an open confrontation strategy against organized crime locally known as guerra contra el narcotrafico and known internationally as the war on drugs. This policy set de facto military control over the country's public security through the deployment of thousands of troops throughout the national territory and the replacement of multiple civil government leaders of public security institutions at all levels by active and retired military elements. An example of this is the fact that elements of the military and federal, state and municipal police forces systematically transfer arrested civilians to military or exclusive control facilities, where without any monitoring of civil authorities, detainees suffer ill treatment, torture and even enforced disappearance. It has also been documented how in joint operations with civilian authorities, military elements dress in civilian clothing. The press and mass media have systematically spread the federal government's vision, where people who are killed as a result of the strategy against organized crime are not civilians but "fallen criminals", without any prior investigation and despite the fact that in many cases it was subsequently proven that they did not belong to any group or organized crime and posed no "threat" to society. Additionally, the violent confrontation of civil public security and armed forces against organized crime groups has increased. The cartels' territorial division was disbanded, the fight for drug distribution routes intensified and large cartels were fragmented into smaller groups that fought for territorial control, diversifying their criminal activity. Likewise, there has been indiscriminate use of lethal force and an unjustifiable extension of State powers, through the adoption of laws and figures, such as arraigo (pre-charge judicial detention) and protected witnesses, which operate to the detriment of judicial rights and guarantees. In 2012 the administration of President Enrique Pena Nieto began. The discourse of war promoted by the Calderon administration was replaced by one of institutional strengthening and building a full rule of law. However, the security strategy has not changed significantly. As a result of the inertia of these strategies, Mexico has accumulated alarming numbers of dead, enforced disappeared and displaced persons, and as a result of the widespread violence there has been an increase in corruption and impunity. Details: Del. Cuauhtemoc, Mexico: PDH, 2016?. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2018 at: https://www.pdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/pdh-violaciones-graves-a-ddhh-en-la-guerra-contra-las-drogas-en-mexico.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.pdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/pdh-violaciones-graves-a-ddhh-en-la-guerra-contra-las-drogas-en-mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 151591 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHuman Rights AbusesIllicit MarketsOrganized CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) National Drug Threat Assessment published in October 2017. These organizations have for years been identified for their strong links to drug trafficking, money laundering, and other violent crimes. These criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, increasingly, the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. U.S. overdoses due to opioid consumption sharply increased to a record level in 2016, following the Mexican criminal syndicates expanded control of the heroin and synthetic opioids market. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft that costs the government's oil company more than a billion dollars a year. Mexico's DTOs have also been in constant flux. Early in his term, former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. In recent years, larger and more stable organizations have fractured, leaving the DEA and other analysts to identify seven organizations as predominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations include the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented further to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. A new transnational criminal organization, Cartel Jalisco-New Generation, which split from Sinaloa in 2010, has sought to become dominant with brutally violent techniques. During the term of President Enrique Peea Nieto that will end in 2018, the government has faced an increasingly complex crime situation that saw violence spike. In 2017, Mexico reached its highest number of total intentional homicides in a year, exceeding, by some counts, 29,000 murders. In the 2017-2018 election period that opened in September 2017 and ran through June 12, 2018, 114 candidates and politicians were killed allegedly by crime bosses and others in an effort to intimidate public office holders, according to a security consultancy that tracks these homicides. On July 1, 2018, Andres Manuel Lopez Obredor won the election for President by as much as 30 points over the next contender. He leads a new party, Morena, but has served as Mayor of Mexico City and comes from a leftist ideological viewpoint. Lopez Obredor campaigned on fighting corruption and finding new ways to combat crime and manage the illicit drug trade. U.S. foreign assistance for Mexico in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) totaled $152.6 million, with more than $100 million of that funding focused on rule of law and counternarcotics efforts. The 115th Congress pursued oversight of security conditions inside of Mexico and monitored the Mexican criminal organizations not only because they are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States but also to appraise their growing control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape in Mexico has been altered by fragmentation of criminal groups and how the organizational shape-shifting continues. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed )ctober 22, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 153043 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal DrugsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Ashby, Paul Title: NAFTA-land Security: The Merida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico Summary: This thesis explores recent U.S. bilateral aid to Mexico through the Merida Initiative (MI), a $2.3 billion assistance commitment on the part of the United States (U.S.) officially justified as helping Mexico build its capacity to take on violent drug cartels and thereby improve security in both countries. There has been a good amount of engaging work on the MI. However this extant literature has not undertaken detailed policy analysis of the aid programme, leading to conclusions that it is a fresh approach to the Mexican counternarcotics (CN) challenge, or that CN is a 'fig leaf' for the U.S. to pursue other 'real' goals. This is a core gap in the literature this project seeks to fill. Through policy analysis, I make an empirically supported argument that Merida is a component of a far more ambitious policy agenda to regionalise security with Mexico more generally. This involves stabilising Mexico itself, not least in response to serious drug-related violence. However the U.S. also aims to improve its own security by giving greater 'depth' to its borders, and seeks protect the political economy of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) from variegated security threats. In this way, recent U.S. policy in Mexico is both derivative of its wider grand strategic traditions in stabilising key political economies in line with its interests, and representative of some distinct developments stemming from the deeply integrated U.S.-Mexican economy as part of NAFTA. To assure U.S. interests accrued to it through the increasingly holistic North American economy, the U.S. has used the MI as the main vehicle in the construction of a nascent 'NAFTA-land Security' framework. Details: Canterbury, UK: University of Kent, 2015. 322p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 24, 2018 at: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/48367/ Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/48367/ Shelf Number: 153069 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomeland SecurityMerida InitiativeOrganized CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: Children's Commissioner for England Title: "Are they shouting because of me?" Voices of children living in households with domestic abuse, parental substance misuse and mental health issues Summary: Much of the research into the impact on children of living in households with domestic abuse, parental substance misuse and mental health is from the perspective of adults - with limited insights from children themselves. We wanted to hear directly from children what it was like to live in these households. Children spoke openly to us about their daily lives - how it affected their emotional well-being, school life and relationships with friends, and the ways in which they attempted to cope. They told us about living with high levels of tension and unpredictability at home, about situations that could explode at any time and of an evolving sense of shame as they began to understand that the chaos and neglect that they took for granted wasn't the same for all children. Children often said they had to find ways to cope which meant that they had to grow up too quickly. For all this, they knew that the alternative without their parent would be painful and often went to great lengths not to tell others for fear of being separated. Despite the problems at home and the impact it had on them, they were also very clear about how much they loved and trusted their parents. Torn between loyalty and love, and the need to seek help, these children were extremely brave in talking about their family life so frankly, and we thank them. Details: London: Children's Commissioner, 2018. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 19, 2018 at: https://www.evidence.nhs.uk/document?id=2061836&returnUrl=Search%3fq%3dgender%2band%2bhousehold%2bchores&q=gender+and+household+chores Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.evidence.nhs.uk/document?id=2061836&returnUrl=Search%3fq%3dgender%2band%2bhousehold%2bchores&q=gender+and+household+chores Shelf Number: 153502 Keywords: Children Exposed to Violence Domestic Abuse Drug-Related ViolenceFamily Violence |
Author: Campos, Juan C. Title: State Incoordination and Political Assassinations in Mexico: Why does the Mexican Government Fail to Protect Mayors from Drug-Trafficking Organizations? Summary: Does state incoordination increase the number of political assassinations in new democracies? In this paper, I answer this question by observing the relationship between political assassinations by drug-trafficking organizations and the lack of party coordination across the state and federal levels of government in Mexico. Despite large bodies of research on political violence, few studies to date have examined this link (Rios, 2015; Duran-Martinez 2015). Specifically, using data compiled by Justice in Mexico, I expect to find that if the two levels of government are not ruled by the same political party between 2005 and 2017, this signals that Mexico's security institutions lack coordination, so the state's ability to protect mayors from assassinations will decline. This is because rule by a single party facilitates cooperation across all levels of government. Such cooperation is necessary to allocate resources properly while combating cartels and stifling their operations, including political assassinations. However, states whose political parties differ from the federal government's party affiliation are - for political reasons - less likely to witness coordination and therefore incapable of protecting mayors from being assassinated. Details: San Diego: Justice in Mexico, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of San Diego, 2018. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: JUSTICE IN MEXICO, WORKING PAPER SERIES, Volume 15, Number 2: Accessed May 9, 2019 at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/181010_Working-Paper_CAMPOS_JUAN.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/181010_Working-Paper_CAMPOS_JUAN.pdf Shelf Number: 155728 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolencePolitical AssassinationsPolitical Violence |